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Foreword 
Friends have asked me rhetorically: “Why do you think it is important to study 
religion and politics? Do you think it matters really?”  
It would be reasonable to ignore religion, if one examined the actual situation and 
found out that a religion has absolutely nothing to do with politics. Looking back to 
history, the religion has really never stayed out of politics. I will give just two 
examples about how religious doctrine and religious symbol have been in the service 
of politics. 
Plato invented a religious theory, which he called ‘theology’ – a doctrine about hell, 
sufferings and rewards in afterlife - and considered it as a good means according to 
which build cities and organize the masses that were unable to perceive the 
immortality of soul through the philosophy. Needless to say, this doctrine became 
popular also in the Middle Ages.  
Another famous example of a religious symbol used in political arena comes from the 
year 312, when on a day before the crucial battle of Milvian Bridge, Constantine the 
Great saw in heaven a vision of a cross bearing the inscription "in hoc signo vinces" 
("in this sign you will be victorious"). Constantine used the religious sign to represent 
his army, was victorious in the battle and both he and his empire were later converted 
to Christianity. This was not a religious doctrine, but a religious symbol, that was 
needed to mobilize the army. 
The Communist regimes made the hardest effort to eliminate religion from public 
sphere, but they succeeded only for a short period. In the beginning of transition to 
democracy, religious institutions and symbols were in no way wiped out of public 
sphere. Religious institutions, the Churches, had got a chance to increase their 
privileges and social influence, and religion entered into politics again.
 6
                                                
 
Introduction 
Transition from Communist rule to democracy put Churches into a totally new 
situation. Formerly repressed religious institutions found new sources of threat - 
religious pluralism, ‘free market of values’, and liberalism that made Church only 
one source of identity and values among many others. The Church had to find a way, 
how to deal with these issues. In most post-communist countries there has been a 
political debate or even confrontation between clerical and anti-clerical political 
forces about issues like Church-state relations, financial assistance to Church, 
restitution of Church property confiscated during Communist regime, Church’s 
influence over social norms and values.  
The Church, although repressed and weakened under the Communist regime, was 
willing to regain its influence over society and political decision-making process. 
During transitional crises religion became more important in public sphere, religious 
identity functioned as a means of compensation for the losses accompanying the 
restructuring of society, and it gave cultural arguments in the public discourse1. In the 
beginning of political competition between parties, religion was a potential resource 
to use for mobilizing the electorate and to build the party’s identity on.  
Where Church had enough power, it launched its project of re-Christianizing the 
society against a parallel project of re-secularizing (in a Western way) the society. As 
a result the political actors took pro- and anti-Church positions and the formation of 
the religious political cleavage started.  
 
1 Agadjanian 2001 
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This study analyses the process of politicization of religious issues in four post-
communist countries. The main question of the study is, whether religion in society 
will eventually come to politics anyway because the social conflicts over religious 
and secular values, and over the public role of the Church will anyway enter politics 
in the long run, and the coming of the religion depends only on the institutional 
strength of the Church and the religious cleavage in society, or is the coming (or not 
coming) of religion to politics dependent also on the strategic choices of the Church? 
This study is important, because the academic research of religion and politics in 
post-communist countries is largely undeveloped, especially concerning post-Soviet 
countries like Estonia2. The situation is better regarding the Visegrad countries 
(Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary), but even there mainly case studies are 
made3. The comparative research in the area of religion and politics has been dealing 
with the voting preferences, party identification and moral attitudes of the practicing 
believers, religious parties and religious cleavage in the party system4, and take as 
granted the fact that the denominational differences influence the interference of 
religion to politics. None of these comparative studies have analyzed the activity of 
the Church using the religious market theory. 
The goal of this study is to test the statement that the strategic choices of the Church 
influence the coming of religion into politics. The hypothesis of this study states that: 
The religious social cleavage and the strength of religion in society are necessary but 
not sufficient variables for the strength of religion in politics. The actual outcome is 
largely influenced by the strategic choices of the Church. 
 
2 The political activity of the Baltic Churches has been analyzed by Goeckel 1995 and Barnett 2001. 
3 Case studies of the Church and state relationship in Poland (Borowik 1996, Eberts 1998, Chan 2000, 
Korbonski 2000), in Hungary (Dobzsay 1996, Schanda 1999, Enyedi 2000a, Enyedi 2000b), in 
Estonia (Hart 1993, Hoppenbrouwers 1999), and in the Czech Republic (DiDomizio 1997, Prihoda 
1997, Tretera 1999, Clark 1999, O’Mahony 2000, Winter 2000).  
4 Gagnere 1993, Toka 1997, Evans et al 1998, Gautier 1998, Herbert 1999, Luxmoore 1999, Mojzes 
1999, White et al 2000, Need et al 2001, Pollack 2001, Flere 2001. These comparative studies 
concentrate mostly on Visegrad countries. 
Figure 1 shows the causal mechanism how the religion in society is brought to the 
politics according to the stated hypothesis.  
Figure 1. The process of politicisation of religion 
 
 
 
Strategic choices 
of the Church 
Religion 
in politics
Religion  
in society 
 
According to the hypothesis the existing religious social cleavage and the strength of 
religion in society form the resources that the Church can, but is not forced to use in 
pursuing its goals. The raised hypothesis will pass the test, if there can be found 
deviations between the strength of religion in society and the strength of religion in 
politics, that are caused by the strategic choices of the Church. The hypothesis will 
not pass the test, if only the structural variables (denominational differences, 
institutional strength of the Church) have been the cause of the deviation. According 
to the hypothesis the deviations, if found, ought to be the outcome of the strategic 
choices made by the Church.  
If the hypothesis will pass the test, then this will testify to the fact that the political 
activity of religious institutions can be analyzed by using religious market theory, the 
choices of the Church are not pre-determined by its doctrine, and the public activities 
of different denominations can effectively be analyzed by using comparative method.  
The hypothesis will not pass the test, if there are either no deviations between the 
strength of religion in society and the strength of religion in politics (i.e. religion has 
in longer perspective ‘automatically’ come to the politics), or the deviations are 
explained by other causal mechanisms and not by the strategic choices of the Church.  
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The comparison of the four case studies eventually shows that the strength of religion 
in society does not automatically equal with the strength of the religion in politics. 
The strategies used by the Church and the choice of radicalism of its demands has 
influenced also the strength of religion in politics.  
Overview of the study 
Chapter 1 gives a theoretical framework and a framework of analysis. There are 
presented the concepts, the social cleavage model and a religious market theory used 
in this study. Based on the theoretical framework, several assumptions and 
propositions are made regarding the activity of the Church, religion in society and 
religion in politics. Figure 2 presents the modified social cleavage model as a 
theoretical basis of this study. The framework of analysis is divided into three parts: 
case studies, the operationalization of variables, and comparative framework. The 
reasons for the case studies are explained and by identifying the indicators of the 
variables, the variables are operationalized. Comparative framework explains how 
the theoretical model (presented in Figure 2) is used to compare the cases in order to 
test the raised hypothesis. 
Chapters 2–5 present four case studies that deal with the politicization of religious 
issues in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Estonia respectively. Each case 
study is divided into three parts: religion in society, religion in politics and the 
strategies used by the Church. In the first sub-section of the case study the structural 
variables (institutional religion, symbolical religion and religious social cleavage) are 
analyzed. The sub-section of religion in politics analyses the religious political 
cleavage, goals attained by the Church through politicization of religious issues, and 
access of the Church to the government. Third sub-section of the case study is 
devoted to the analysis of the strategies used by the Church and the radicalism of its 
demands during three parliamentary elections. Each case study ends with a discussion 
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how the strategic choices of the Church have influenced the strength-value of religion 
in politics. 
In Chapter 6 the cases are compared according to the theoretical model and analytical 
framework presented in Chapter 1. The cases are compared according to the values of 
the variables that the cases have obtained in the case studies. According to the 
comparison of independent and dependent variables the strength-value order of the 
cases deviates on three occasions. In the end of Chapter 6 the causal influence of the 
strategic choices of the Church that has led to these deviations, is explained. The 
main outcomes of the study are summarized in the Conclusion. 
 11
                                                
 
Chapter 1. Theoretical and analytical framework 
The basis of this study is the social cleavage model, but not in a pure form. The social 
cleavage model is modified by usage of the religious market theory for assessing the 
strategic choices made by the Church. And finally, the comparative method is used in 
order to find co-relations and deviations from co-relations between the cases 
according to the strength-values of religion in society and religion in politics.  
But before going on to the theoretical framework, the main concepts used in the study 
– Christian party and Christian Democratic party, Church, institutional and 
symbolical religion, religious market, religious firm, religious economy, politicized 
religious issue, cleavage – are defined.  
1.1. Definitions 
The categorization between Christian parties and Christian Democratic parties takes 
into account the Christian Democratic tradition of Western Europe. Christian 
Democratic parties are secular rather than religious parties, although they retain 
traces of religious identity. Christian parties appeal more directly to the religious 
electorate, are more dependent on church, tend to take more extreme positions, and 
use religion (or issues related to religion or the church) as a primary issue for political 
mobilization and the construction of political identities5.  
 
5 Kalyvas 1996:119. Stathis Kalyvas defines these parties as confessional, but for the sake of 
convenience they are defined here as Christian parties. For example, it would not be correct to define 
the Estonian Christian People’s Party as a confessional party, although it is mainly backed by several 
neo-Protestant churches. 
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Another measures that are used to distinguish between these two types of parties are 
the membership in the Christian Democratic International and the rejection of too 
extreme political positions6. Christian Democracy has an ideology of its own and is 
not standing exclusively and radically for the interests of the church.  
This study deals with a Church or Churches that are politically important and 
historically dominant religious traditions. The smaller neo-Protestant Churches have 
also been politically active (the Faith Church in Hungary, Baptist and Pentecostal 
Churches in Estonia), but as these churches are minor churches and have relatively 
few church-members (under 2% of the population), these are not included into the 
study. When I refer to ‘Church’, I mean in cases of Poland and the Czech Republic 
the Roman Catholic Church; Estonian Evangelical Lutheran Church in case of 
Estonia and privileged traditional Churches (Roman Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist 
and Jewish) in case of Hungary. These four denominations in Hungary share the 
same legal privileges and act as a unitary actor in the defense of their interests, thus 
also in case of Hungary I call them a ‘Church’ or ‘traditional Churches’7. 
Religion in society is divided into institutional religion and symbolical religion. The 
indicators of institutional religion are the levels of religious attendance and religious 
affiliation of the population, and the public support to the social positions and 
doctrines of the Church. The indicator of symbolical religion is the proximity of the 
religion to the national identity. Institutional religion describes the influence of the 
religious institution over the believers. But not all believers share the positions of the 
Church and there are those who are not religiously affiliated or practicing, but still 
feel connected to religion through their national identity. This non-Church religiosity 
 
6 Christian Democratic parties cover a wide range of political opinion and practice (Hanley 1994:3), 
but Christian Democratic International has rejected membership to several parties that nominally are 
Christian Democratic, because of their too extreme positions. For the Christian Democrats the 
philosophical, ethical and cultural issues are paramount. The Christian Democrats occupy a middle 
ground between Gesellschaft (‘community’ ideologies, represented by liberalism) and Gemeinschaft 
(‘society’ ideologies, represented by nationalism and ecologism) ideologies (Dierickx 1994:17-18,29). 
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of the population, religiosity that is linked to national identity, is defined as 
symbolical religion.  
Religion is any system of beliefs and practices concerned with ultimate meaning that 
assumes the existence of the supernatural.  
The religious market theory takes as an assumption that the Church is motivated by 
self-interest and acts like a rational actor. Religion is seen as a commodity – an object 
of choice and production. Consumers choose what religion (if any) they will accept. 
As with other commodities, this ability to choose constrains the producers of religion. 
Religious firms (the Churches) are social enterprises whose primary purpose is to 
create, maintain and supply religion to some set of individuals. Under competitive 
conditions, a particular religious firm will flourish only if it provides a commodity at 
least as attractive as its competitors. And as in other markets, government regulation 
can profoundly affect the producers’ incentives, the consumers’ options, and the 
aggregate equilibrium. Religious economy consists of all the religious activity going 
on in the society.8
Politicized religious issue is an issue linked to religious values or religious institution 
that causes an emergence of political conflict. When a solution is attained in these 
issues, the confrontation around them may end, or produce further controversies. In 
the last case, the issue becomes a long-lasting one and an indicator of religious 
political cleavage.  
‘Cleavage’ is a critical division in opinion, beliefs or interests that leads to opposition 
between two groups, but is essentially more than just a conflict. Cleavage is a 
division that is accompanied by some structural forms of conflict that are nurtured 
 
7 To say church regarding Jewish denomination is formally not correct, but for the sake of 
convenience, I use such simplification. 
8 The description of religious market is based on Iannaccone et al 1997:351. I follow the definitions of 
religious firm and religious economy of Stark et al 1994.  
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through socialization9. Cleavage, whether political or social, is the strongest, when 
the opposing sides are equal and there is no one left that is indifferent in the conflict 
issue. The more biased conflict is to one side, the weaker it is.  
This study identifies the social and political conflicts as cleavages, although the time 
has been too short for real political cleavages to emerge in post-communist countries. 
It would be more correct to speak about political divides, because the real cleavages 
are still in the process of formation. But as religion is one of the most fundamental 
bases of cleavage in society10, political religious divides are defined as ‘political 
religious cleavage’ in this study. 
1.2. Social cleavage model 
Every political society is split by cleavages, which vary greatly in intensity, 
distribution, and manner of combination11. These cleavages may be ‘cross-cutting’ or 
‘overlapping’12, in the last case the cleavages divide the society in larger extent.  
There is no such thing as ‘cleavage theory’. Political cleavages are associated with a 
vocabulary of concepts. These can be applied systematically in a range of theories 
that specify factors affecting the salience of cleavages, and consequences flowing 
from the fragmentation and cross-cutting caused by a particular cleavage structure13. 
 
9 Cleavages require a structure, while conflict is not always accompanied by a defined structure 
(Shiratori 1997:6-7). 
10 The most fundamental bases of cleavage are usually assumed to include social class, religion, 
nationality, language, race and gender (Laver 1992:440). 
11 Mény 1994:19 
12 Cross-cutting cleavages tend to off-set one another: for example, some Catholics are rich, others 
poor, some bourgeois, others workers, some rural, others urban, some more conservative politically, 
others less so. Cross-cutting cleavages of this kind help to create solidarities between different groups 
and reduce likelihood of the conflict and violence that are so common where cleavages overlap. (Mény 
1994:20) 
13 Laver 1992:442 
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Of the many applications of social cleavages14, this study concentrates on the model 
of Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967), which states that the formation 
of Western European party system took place through institutionalization of social 
cleavages through the activity of political parties. The following four major social 
cleavages were the basis of creating parties in Western Europe: center/periphery 
cleavage for ethnically and linguistically based parties; state/church cleavage for 
religious parties; land/industry cleavage for agrarian, conservative and liberal parties; 
owner/worker cleavage for socialist and communist parties15. Lipset and Rokkan 
attempted to account for the variations in western European party systems in terms of 
the historical development of the cleavage structure and in particular of the 
abovementioned four cleavages. They stated that these social cleavages that have 
been transferred into the party system tend to remain “frozen” over longer periods of 
time16. 
The religion becomes a dividing force in political arena based on the religious social 
divide, which in its more intensive and durable form can become a religious 
cleavage. Depending on the context and on the ‘confessional map’ of the country, 
there could be clerical/anti-clerical, Catholic/Protestant or religious/secular 
cleavage17. There also had to be a party, that institutionalized this cleavage.  
 
14 For example, Arendt Lijphart’s model of consociational democracy shows how under certain 
circumstances, the absence of cross-cutting cleavages can make for stability (Arendt Lijphart (1997) 
Democracy in Plural Societies: a comparative exploration. New Haven: Yale University Press). 
15 Ronald Inglehart added also material/postmaterial cleavage as the younger people no longer voted 
strictly according to membership of a social group, but on the base of individually held opinions and 
values (Inglehart, Ronald (1977) The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among 
Western Publics, Princeton: Princeton University Press). Material/post-material cleavage was the basis 
for green and ecology parties (Klingemann et al, 1994:6). 
16  Lipset and Rokkan 1967:50 
17 In Catholic countries there developed clerical versus anticlerical cleavage, which was based on 
disputes about schooling, abortion or divorce. Protestant versus Catholic cleavage developed in 
countries with mixed religious affiliations. In Protestant countries the disputes were about alcohol, 
unconventional life styles and the status of Biblical accounts of the origins of the species and so there 
was developed ‘morally traditional’ versus ‘morally permissive’ cleavage. 
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In this study the interdenominational cleavage is left out, as only the political activity 
of the dominant churches is under examination and the Church in Estonia, Poland, 
Hungary and Czech Republic is defined in such a way that the interdenominational 
conflict is not relevant. The conflict in Hungary between four privileged Churches 
and new minor religious groups is seen as a clerical/anti-clerical18 cleavage. Also the 
anti-Catholicism in the Czech case is seen as anti-clericalism.  
In order to translate the cleavage into the political arena, the activity of political 
parties becomes important19. I admit that the interests of the parties are not identical 
with the interests of the church; the choices, strategies and organizational capability 
of parties are important in the process of institutionalization of the cleavage as parties 
can choose and promote some social cleavages to be politicized and neglect others20. 
But parties still do not create social cleavages, and choices available for the parties 
and their links to the Church are preconditioned by the strength of institutional and 
symbolical religion, and the choices made by the Church. This study concentrates on 
the strategic choices made by the Church. 
1.3. Religious market theory  
Religious market theory21 is a rational choice theory of religion. Rational choice 
theory uses deductive methods modeled on neoclassical microeconomics. It starts 
 
18 Clericalism is a term used to describe the influence of religious hierarchies in political systems 
(Madeley 1992:107). 
19 Peter Mair states that ‘it is parties who ultimately set the agenda, determine the terms of reference 
through which voters understand and interpret the political world’ (Mair 1998:9). 
20 Broughton et al 2000:4. Alan Ware states that because of the multiplicity of interests and identities 
in a society there is no natural order of conflicts, which then gets reflected and represented in a party 
system (Ware 1996:197). Also Angelo Panebianco criticizes the assumptions (that also this study 
makes) according to which the activities of parties are the product of the “demands” of social groups 
or a priori “goals” are attributed to parties (Panebianco 1988:4).  
21 Rational choice theory used for the study of relationship between church and state has many 
different variations. This theory has been called also ‘a theory of religious mobilization’, ‘religious 
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with assumptions, from which are derived non-obvious conclusions, which are then 
tested against observed behavior22. The main assumption, drawn from economics, 
states that actors in a process utilize the most efficient means for pursuing their 
goals23.  
Adam Smith was the one who laid the foundation for the economic theory to be used 
for analyzing the activity of religious institutions. He argued that self-interest 
motivates clergy just as it does secular producers, that market forces constrain 
churches just as they do secular firms; and that the benefits of competition, the 
burdens of monopoly, and the hazards of government regulation are as real in religion 
as in any sector of the economy24.  
According to religious market theory the demand for religion is stable and the key 
variable is the supply of ‘religious products’. The levels of religious vitality are 
influenced by the structure of the religious economy25. State control of the religious 
market suppresses diversity by inflating the start-up costs for new religions, the 
relaxation of state control leads to increased diversity of religious products and then 
to increased consumption26. Using the religious market theory the following 
assumptions about the Church27 are made: 
Assumption 1. Religious institutions are unitary actors that act in a rational way.  
This assumption means that the choices of the Church are not pre-determined by its 
doctrine, but the Church uses the most efficient means for pursuing its goals. The 
 
economics’, or ‘economic model of church-state relations’ (Bruce 1999; Iannaccone 1991;1992;1998; 
Iannaccone et al 1997; Stark et al 1994;1996; Kalyvas 1998; Gill 1994;1999). 
22 McLean 1992:520 
23 Ware 1996:12 
24 Iannaccone 1991:1 
25 Bruce 1999:269 
26 Ibid. pp. 268,271 
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choices of the Church regarding social and political questions are not driven wholly 
by theological necessity, but are at least to some degree, driven by strategic 
concerns28.  
Assumption 2. The church wants to gain or protect its position of monopoly in the 
religious market.  
Every Church offers “the Absolute Truth”. Absence of competition in the religious 
market leaves the ‘product’ of the Church unquestioned29. The option of becoming a 
monopoly in religious market is more cost-effective way to handle religious 
competition than the improvement of the quality and marketing of the ‘product’. The 
capacity of a Church to monopolize a religious economy depends upon the degree to 
which the state regulates the religious economy. 
Assumption 3. The Church needs an access to the government.  
It is one of the main purposes for the Church to obtain access to the political 
decision-making process as the regulation of religious market is done through laws30. 
When a religious monopoly is installed by state, this monopoly exerts influence over 
other institutions and as a result the society will be sacralized – the primary aspects of 
life, from family to politics, will be suffused with religious symbols, rhetoric, and 
ritual31.  
 
27 These assumptions are valid for the dominant Churches in the religious market. For a small Church, 
for example for a Church with 10 members, it is obvious that the first choice would be the 
improvement in the quality and marketing of the ‘product’, and legal equality of the religious groups. 
28 Douglas Perkins has said: “Theology, like any ideology, often provides a great deal of wiggle room 
when put into practice” (Perkins 2001:22). 
29 Gill 1994:406 
30 Prohibiting competition is more cost effective than actually competing. So it is logical to assume 
that maintaining friendly relations with the state is in the interests of the church. (Gill 1994:405,412) 
31 Stark & Iannaccone 1994 
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In the post-Communist setting the regulation of church-state relationship (and 
religious market) was an issue that all countries considered in this study had to solve. 
All Churches were willing to get more restrictive laws for the regulation of the 
entrance of ‘newcomers’ (new religious groups) to the religious market. While the 
political arena was secular during Communist time, the religious economy was not 
ruled essentially by free religious market. The traditional Churches were those 
religious firms that clearly dominated the religious economy. Emerging religious 
pluralism in the beginning of transition promoted the project of further ‘de-
sacralisation’ of the society due to relatively liberal laws for registration of religious 
groups. The Church, in turn, wanted to re-sacralize the society and to set the social 
norms.  
According to the raised hypothesis, which sees the strength of religion in society as a 
necessary (but not sufficient) basis for the strength of religion in politics, the 
following propositions are made:  
Proposition 1. The stronger the institutional religion is, the stronger is the ability of 
the Church to politicize religious issues. 
Proposition 2. Strength of institutional religion and strength of symbolical religion 
are pre-conditions of the emergence of the religious political cleavage. 
Strength of institutional and symbolical religion, and strength of religious social 
cleavage are the pre-conditions for the formation of religious political cleavage. If the 
pre-conditions are fulfilled, the emergence of religious political cleavage and its 
strength, are not yet pre-determined. The actual intensity of the religious political 
cleavage and the strength of religion in politics depend also on the strategic choices 
that Church makes (as shown on the Figure 2).  
The Church takes into consideration three aspects: the level of uncertainty of the 
access to government, the radicalism of its demands and the choice of the strategy 
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(they way of getting access to the government). The Church has to balance these 
three aspects, as the level of uncertainty of getting access to the government increases 
the more radical demands the Church makes and the less neutral it is regarding the 
competition of political parties.  
If the Church does not interfere to the political competition of parties, then it is more 
likely that it will have the access to the government (if Church does not support any 
political party, it is reasonable to assume that the attitudes of the political parties will 
not differ regarding the Church either). The lower the number of the parties supported 
by the Church, the higher the level of uncertainty of the access to the government.  
Choosing the political allies with more radical positions allows the Church better to 
defend its interests in the political arena, but it limits the possibility of getting access 
to the government, as the too extreme positions of the Church and its political allies 
ought logically find less support among the electorate. While remaining neutral, the 
Church obviously has to have quite moderate demands that will not bring along the 
formation of radical opposition to Church’s interests among parties. The alternative 
strategies of the Church are identified in more detail in the analytical framework of 
the study. Here, in the Figure 2, the choice available for the Church is shown as from 
neutrality regarding the competition of political parties to radical strategy of being 
closely identified with a political party (or parties) that closely represents the interests 
of the Church. Too radical demands and the choice of too radical political allies 
obviously increase the uncertainty of the access to the government. Too moderate 
demands may leave the goals unfulfilled.  
The Church as a rational actor is seeking for the best means to attain its goals. What 
is best strategic choice of demands and strategy in one situation may not be the best 
one in the next one. There is no universal and ideal combination, which the Church 
ought to use. The Church may find that there is a need to change the strategy or 
radicalism of demands.  
 
Figure 2. Modified social cleavage model 
 
 21
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
The strength of 
symbolical religion 
Strength 
of  
religious 
social 
cleavage 
Ability of 
the 
Church to 
politicize 
religious 
issues 
In order to attain its goals 
Church wants to get 
access to government  
Strength of 
religious 
political 
cleavage
Church chooses a 
combination of strategy 
and demands 
moderate demands  radical
neutral strategy  radical
low uncertainty of access to government high
Level of 
Church’s 
goals 
attained
Church’s 
actual access 
to  the 
government
Preconditions of the
emergence of religious
political cleavage 
Strength of institutional 
religion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 22
Proposition 3. The Church, in pursuing its aims and taking into account its structural 
resources, chooses a combination of the radicalism of demands and a way to get 
access to the government, which affects the strength of religion in politics. 
The strategic choices made by the Church affect the eventual outcome – strength of 
religion in politics, which is measured by three indicators of independent variable 
(the strength of religious political cleavage; the actual access of the Church to the 
government and the level of Church’ fulfilled goals).  
The modified social cleavage model (Figure 2) is the theoretical basis of the study. 
This model does not claim that certain combination of demands and strategy 
produces invariably a certain pre-determined result. The Church chooses radicalism 
of demands and strategy by taking into account the structural resources it has 
available and the uncertainty of the access to the government that the chosen strategy 
involves. The Church has to balance the radicalism of demands and uncertainty of the 
access to the government.  
1.4. Framework of analysis 
1.4.1. Case-studies 
The case studies of the countries have two aims: (1) to explain, how each case has 
obtained the values of the variables that are used in the comparison of the cases; (2) 
to show how the strategies and choices made by the Church have caused the changes 
that altered the previous position of this case in the strength-value relations between 
the independent variables of the cases.  
The cases of this study - Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Estonia - are 
chosen because of several aspects: all of them came under Communist regime after 
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WW II; the democratization of these countries has been successful; and they provide 
different sets of similarities and differences in the dependent and independent 
variables used in this study.  
1.4.2 Operationalization of the variables 
There are two types of religious social cleavage: anti/clericalism-clericalism and 
religious-secular. Anti-clericalism is an attitude against political interference of the 
church. In this case, the social cleavage is centered upon the rights and privileges of 
the institutional religion. Religious/secular cleavage involves a conflict between 
religious and secular moral attitudes. The strength of the religious social cleavage is 
measured in 5-point scale (5 – very strong, 4 – strong, 3 – middle, 2 – weak, 1 – very 
weak) based on the empirical data about how strongly has the society been polarized 
according to this cleavage.  
The other structural variable is the strength of religion. This variable has two 
indicators – strength of institutional religion and strength of symbolical religion. In 
each case both of them are measured according to a similar five-point scale. The 
institutional strength of religion is measured according to the following indicators: 
the levels of religious affiliation; the level of religious attendance; and popular 
support of the social positions of the Church. The symbolical strength of religion is 
measured according to the proximity of religion to national identity32. 
Institutional and symbolical strength of religion form the resources that Church can 
use. The stronger these resources are, the more capable is the Church to present 
radical claims, yet the actual radicalism of the demands and the choice of strategy 
depends on the Church.  
 
32 If national identity is inherently secular, then it is called ‘civic nationalism’ (Agadjanian 2001). 
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The possible strategies of the Church that in the theoretical framework were 
identified as situated between two poles – neutral and radical – are operationalized in 
the following way. The strategies of the Church are divided into three groups: (1) 
neutrality regarding political competition of the parties; (2) Christian Democratic 
strategy; (3) and Christian strategy. In public activity the Church usually chooses a 
combination between these strategies – for example a mixture of Christian and 
Christian Democratic strategy. It is analyzed, which of these strategies has the 
Church relied most on and how this emphasis has changed during the first three 
parliamentary elections.  
The strategic choice to remain neutral regarding the political competition of parties 
does not mean only the official position of the Church to remain neutral, but also the 
essential neutrality.  
The Christian strategy is the choice of the Church to rely on the Christian parties that 
represent more directly the institutional religion (social positions and interests of the 
Church). This strategy is the most radical by nature, but the choice of this strategy 
would be most ‘natural’ for the Church, if the Church has decided not to remain 
neutral in the political competition of parties. By using this strategy, the interests of 
the Church are represented most directly. 
Christian Democratic strategy concentrates on religion in broader and more 
symbolical terms, and in this case the Church supports and finds allies among 
Christian Democratic parties or among parties, which defend the Church’s interests in 
broader and more symbolical terms. The parties chosen as allies according to the 
Christian Democratic strategy are not Christian parties (i.e. their primary political 
appeal is not religion). The Church relies on a political ideology that represents 
religion in very broad terms, as Christian Democracy is essentially a secular ideology 
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with religious roots33. The choice of the Church to rely on Christian Democratic 
parties testifies to the fact that the Church is rationally seeking for a way that serves 
best its interests.  
Also the outcomes are analyzed. The variables for the religion in politics are: (1) the 
strength of religious political cleavage; (2) goals attained by the Church; (3) access of 
the Church to the government. 
The indicators of the religious political cleavage are: (1) religion as an indicator of 
voting preference and party identification; (2) religion as a basis of government 
coalition formation; (3) the existence of overlapping cleavages, which magnify the 
impact of religion in political arena.  
Goals attained by the Church are measured by using the five-point scale according to 
the level how the politicized religious issues were solved34. Finally, the assessment is 
made about the level of Church’ fulfilled goals and overall value is given according 
to the same five-point scale. 
Access of the Church to the government is measured according to the five-point scale 
based on the ability of the Church to influence the decisions of the governmental 
coalitions during three electoral periods in favor of its interests.  
 
33 As Stathis Kalyvas has stated: “Christian Democracy does not equal Church, Christianity or 
Catholicism. It’s type of religious political identity that does not equal with social religious identity.” 
(Kalyvas 1996: 245) 
34 5 points are given if the issue was solved favorably for the Church, 4 points are given if the issue 
was solved basically favorably for the Church but with restrictions, 3 points are given for the 
compromise solution, 2 points are given for the issue that was solved unfavorably for the Church, but 
the Church had some influence over decisions and its interests were not ignored totally, 1 point is 
given for an issue that was solved unfavorably for the Church. 
1.4.3. Comparative framework 
According to the modified social cleavage model presented in Figure 2, the values of 
the indicators of the independent variables (variables of the religion in society) and 
dependent variables (variables of the strength of religion in politics) are compared 
according to the strength-value that these cases have obtained in the case studies. 
Figure 3. Comparison of the independent and dependent variables 
 
Indicator of independent variable  Indicator of dependent variable 
        (religion in society)  (religion in politics) 
 
strong 
              Case 1  Case 1  
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              Case 2  Case 2 
              Case 3  Case 3 
              Case 4  Case 4 
weak 
 
 
Indicator of independent variable  Indicator of dependent variable 
        (religion in society)  (religion in politics) 
 
strong 
              Case 1  Case 2  
              Case 2  Case 1 
              Case 3 deviation Case 4 
              Case 4  Case 3 
weak 
co-relation 
Figure 3 describes the process of comparison. The cases are put into strength-value 
order according to every variable. The logical co-relation between the values of 
independent and dependent variables would show that every case has retained its 
position regarding other cases. The case that had strongest value of independent 
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variable has also the strongest value of dependent variable. The case, which had a 
second strength-value of independent variable, has also a second strength-value of 
dependent variable and so on. If the strength of religion in society had the strongest 
value in the case of Poland, so ought it to have the strongest value also of the strength 
of religion in politics.  
But if the strength-value relationship between independent and dependent variables 
of the cases is not the same, then there exists a deviation from the co-relations. 
The goal of the comparison is to find out these deviations between the strength-
values of the independent variables and dependent variables.  
If there are no deviations found, then there is no reason to expect that the strategic 
choices of the Church have caused any change in the outcome in longer perspective, 
and the hypothesis will not pass the test. 
If the deviations are found, then the strategies and radicalism of goals used by the 
Church become important. The strategic choices of the Church are compared as 
condition variables35, which have influenced the variations in the dependent variable.  
Finally, comparing the strategies and demands used by the Church in different cases 
tests the causal effect of the strategic choices of the Church.  
 
35 The values of condition variables govern the size of the impact that independent variables have on 
dependent variables (Van Evera 1997:11). 
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Chapter 2. Poland 
2.1. Religion in society 
2.1.1. Institutional religion  
Poland is a highly religious country in terms of religious affiliation and practice36. As 
a rule, the levels of religiosity, that have risen during transition crises in post-
communist countries, fall back soon, but in Poland there has been no decline in the 
high levels of Church attendance, religious practice (praying) and strength of belief 
even several years after the times of transition crises37.  
Yet various types of Catholics38 have different attitudes regarding the politically 
relevant religious issues. In 1997 majority of Poles did not share the attitude of the 
Catholic Church regarding premarital sex and euthanasia39. Polish people support 
some goals of the Church and reject others. A majority of the population has no 
objection to religion in the schools40. Population seems to be almost equally divided 
 
36 According to the European Values Study Surveys from 1999 95.7% of Polish people claim to 
belong to a religious denomination, 98.4% of respondents belong to the Catholic Church and 78.2% 
claimed to visit the Church more than once a month (Halman 2001:74, 75, 78).  
37 According to Polish General Social Surveys (PGSS) these levels remained almost the same from 
1992 to 1997, in Chan 2000:179 
38 N.J. Demerath distinguishes three types of Polish Catholics - religious Catholics, the family 
Catholics and the cultural Catholics that represent different attitudes regarding the social positions of 
the Church. (Demerath 2000:129-130) 
39 PGSS of 1997 revealed that 71 per cent of respondents approved of the death penalty, whereas only 
17 per cent thought it was wrong, 49 per cent thought voluntary euthanasia should be allowed, 
whereas 34 per cent condemned it, 57 per cent believed that premarital sex was not wrong at all, and 
only 8 per cent supported a total ban on abortion. (Chan 2000:177-178) 
40 Demerath 2000:129 
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on the issue of religious censorship of media41. Most clearly population feels that the 
Church ought to stay out of politics42. Having set as goals a total ban of abortion and 
active interference to politics, the Church acts in opposition to the average will of the 
Polish electorate. 
The most obvious indicators of strong religious social cleavage are the abortion issue 
and the political influence of the Church. Regarding abortion the electorate is 
polarized from radical pro-choice to radical anti-abortion, while the average voter 
tends to favor more liberal solution than Church or clerical parties. Also regarding the 
political influence of the Church the population is divided, but tends more to reject 
than endorse the Church’s influence43. Especially in the first half of 1990s the public 
trust regarding the Church was declining due to the opinion that the Church interfered 
too much in public life and was too closely linked to the new institutions of the 
state44. In 1996 the disapproval of the Church political activity reached its peak45. 
The electorate was firmly polarized regarding Church interference to politics by 
1997. Based on the respondents’ opinions on religious education, abortion, and the 
ratification of the Concordat, Polish General Social Survey discovered in 1997 that 
Poland is divided into two more or less equal clerical-traditional (42 per cent) and 
secular groups (46 per cent). The former group is composed of devoted Catholics, 
regular Church-goers, and right-wingers who contend that the Church should play an 
active role in the social and political arenas, whereas the latter group is composed of 
sceptical Catholics, non-believers, and left-wingers who advocate the separation of 
 
41  In 1996 almost 50% of respondents were in favour of censorship protecting religious feelings of the 
believers, whereas 35% of respondents were against it (Eberts 1998:832). 
42 Even two-thirds of those who attend church regularly share this sentiment (Demerath, 2000:129).  
43 Kitschelt et al 1999:318-319. 90% of the Poles characterise themselves as Catholic, but two-thirds 
of the population believe that the political influence of the Church is too strong (Enstad 2000:145).  
According to the PGSS, between 1992-97, more than half of Poles believed that the Church had too 
much power. (1992 – 63%, 1993 – 65%, 1994 – 54%, 1995 – 54%, 1997 – 52%). (Chan 2000:183) 
44 Beyme 1996:157-158. According to the European Values Study Surveys of 1999 only 9.4% of 
Polish people agreed that religious leaders should influence government decisions (Halman 2001:107) 
45 An overwhelming 85.8% of respondents declared that they were against the Church's direct 
participation in political life (Eberts 1998:830). 
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the Church and religious values from the state. There is also a very small, moderate 
group (12 per cent), which expressed mixed feelings towards the Church and its 
teachings.46
2.1.2. Symbolical religion 
Poland became a Christian country in the year 965, when prince Mieszko accepted 
Catholic baptism. From 1385 to 1572 Poland together with Lithuania formed 
Jagellonian Empire, which at its apex stretched from the Baltic to the Black Sea47. 
While the old eastern border of the Jagellonian Empire still roughly marks the 
boundary between the western Catholic and Uniate churches and the Eastern 
Orthodoxy48, only about half of the population of that empire was Catholic. 
Protestantism was an important social force in Poland for 130 years (1520-1650) as 
persecuted Protestant groups came to Poland from Germany, France, Bohemia, and 
Italy. Protestantism, brought to Poland by immigrants, was expunged by the mid-
seventeenth century49. There has not been a typical church vs. state conflict, because 
of little influence that Reformation had in Poland.  
In 1772 Poland was partitioned between Russia, Prussia and Austria-Hungary50. As 
all the neighbors except Austria-Hungary, were non-Catholics, the defense of Polish 
nation, cultural identity, habits and customs increasingly took on a Polish-Catholic 
identification51.  
Between World Wars the Second Republic passed through the authoritarian rule of 
General Pilsudski (1926-35) to a repressive, nationalistic and anti-Semitic 
 
46 Chan 2000:189 
47 Enstad 2000:137 
48 Aarebrot and Knutsen 2000:20; Michta 1997:70 
49 Ramet 1998:101 
50 Zarycki 2000:860 
51 Mojzes 1999; Zarycki 2000:858; Ramet 1998:93; Chan 2000:176 
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presidential dictatorship, which was marked by religious and national intolerance, but 
gave privileges to the Catholic Church52. During World War II as well as during the 
communist regime, the Catholic Church was an institution where Polish identity was 
preserved and political opposition both against fascists and communists was 
supported53. After the Second World War Poland was territorially moved 150 miles 
to the West, what made it significantly more homogeneous both ethnically and 
religiously54, as it had lost sizeable non-Catholic minorities55. 
Although the Catholic Church was restricted in its public activities during the entire 
period of communist rule, it remained independent of the state56 and in confrontation 
with the state. In 1953 the regime arrested the Polish Primate, Cardinal Stefan 
Wyszynski, and put to prison eight bishops and 900 priests57, but the government had 
to acknowledge the social strength of the Church and sought co-operation with the 
Church. In April 1950 the Church and the government had signed an agreement, 
which promised certain freedom and benefit to the Church in exchange for its 
willingness to promote respect for the communist authorities58. In comparison with 
the situation of religious institutions in other Soviet satellite countries, Catholic 
Church in Poland had quite a number of privileges59, which enabled it to retain its 
institutional strength until the end of the Communist rule. 
 
52 Enstad 2000:138; Crawford 1996:330; Mojzes 1999 
53 Enstad 2000:145; Mojzes 1999 
54 In 1921 the Polish Republic was inhabited by 19 million Poles, four million Ukrainians, two million 
Jews, one million Germans and Byelorussians respectively, and smaller groups of Lithuanians, 
Russians and Czechs, besides two million Poles were living in the Soviet Union and 1.5 million in 
Germany (Enstad 2000:138). 
55 Since the end of the war, Roman Catholics have accounted for over 90% of the country's total 
population (Eberts 1998:818). 
56 Parrott 1997:13; Zarycki 2000:856; Michta 1997:73; Merdjanova 2000:252 
57 Eberts 1998:819 
58 Eberts 1998:819 
59 It had its own newspapers, a Catholic university in Lublin and the Polish armed forces had Catholic 
chaplains (White et al 2000:681); Polish Catholic Church had also free relations with Vatican (Enstad 
2000:140); In 1957 the suppressed Catholic periodical Znak was revived, Catholic laity were given 
independent representation in the Sejm, Catholic Intelligentsia Clubs received permission to operate in 
Warsaw, Krakow, Torun, Posnan, and Wroclaw (Ramet 1998:33). 
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The regime was seeking co-operation with the Church especially in times of internal 
crises. Uprisings in 1956, 1968, 1970 and 1976 culminated finally with general 
strikes and the founding of the non-communist (or even Catholic) trade union 
Solidarity in 198060. By that time Karol Wojtyla had become the first non-Italian 
Pope after centuries and that made the Catholic Church even more popular61. By the 
end of Communist regime the Church had become the only legitimate authority in the 
country in the eyes of the people62, the Catholic Church could claim to represent the 
entire nation, it was the oldest, the most trusted and most powerful social institution, 
which had upheld and defended Polish national identity and values in the face of the 
partitions, the two World Wars and Communism63. 
A strong tradition of religious unity and loyalty to the papacy, gave religion a high 
potential of mobilization64. 
Table 1. Poland. Indicators of the religion in society 
Indicator Nature Value 
Strength of 
institutional religion 
Levels of religious attendance and affiliation 
very high 
Very 
strong (5) 
Strength of 
symbolical religion 
National idea very closely linked to 
Catholicism. In the beginning of transition the 
public role of the Church was seen as legitimate 
by population.  
Very 
strong (5) 
Clerical/anti-clerical 
cleavage 
Conflict concentrates on the church influence 
on politics 
Very 
strong (5) 
Religious-secular 
cleavage 
Conflict concentrates on the abortion issue Very 
strong (5) 
 
                                                 
60 Enstad 2000:139. Solidarity workers movement was in close collaboration with the Catholic Church 
(Demerath 2000:128), if not totally a Catholic movement, like Piotr Korys have called it, as its leaders 
emphasized their connections with the church (Korys 2000:5). Kenneth Ka-Lok Chan states that 
Solidarity was “also a moral crusade based on an extraordinary mixture of romanticism, nationalism 
and Catholicism” (Chan 2001:613). 
61 Mojzes 1999 
62 Michta 1997:73; Ramet 1998:100,101. Church was a safe haven for dissidents, symbol of freedom 
and opposition to the communist authorities. When the talks between Solidarity and the Communist 
Party began in August 1988, the Church was the best intermediary available (Eberts 1998:819). 
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2.2. Religion in politics 
2.2.1. Religious political cleavage 
Religious political cleavage emerged to Polish party competition already in the 
beginning of 1990s, when the positions of Polish parties regarding abortion covered 
the whole continuum from radical pro-choice to radical anti-abortion. Also regarding 
the political influence of the Church the positions of Polish parties covered the whole 
continuum from rejection to endorsing.65  
Religion became a basis of government coalition formation and also an indicator of 
voting preference and party identification66, but not on the same level as in Hungary, 
because in 1997 the pro-Church AWS had to form a coalition with a party, that hold a 
middle position on religious-secular scale and the main polarisation during the 
elections of the 1990s has been between the post-Solidarity and post-communist 
parties67.  
The major political parties after 1997 were clearly differentiated as to religious 
backing. The pro-Church parties gained most of the votes of practicing Catholics, the 
anti-clerical parties received most of the votes of non-practicing Catholics68. 
The political cleavages really do not overlap in the extent like they do in Hungary, 
but there is co-relation between religious, nationalist and anti-Communist right-wing 
 
63 Chan 2000:176; Herbert 1999:288  
64 Gagnere 1993 
65 Kitschelt et al 1999:318-319 
66 Smolar 1998:130. Religious individuals tend to vote for pro-Church parties and groupings (ZChN, 
PC, PL, the Solidarity trade union, and AWS), whereas members from the secular group are more 
likely to be found among supporters of liberal or secular left-wing parties (SLD, UP, KLD, UD, and 
UW) (Chan 2000:190). 
67 Smolar 1998:129; Enstad 2000:144; Michta 1997:90 
68 Flere 2001:196. According to a survey from September 1997, pro-Church AWS was supported by 
36% of those who attend church several times per week and 8% of those who never attend church, the 
numbers for anti-clerical SLD were 5% and 34% respectively (Szczerbiak 1999:1430). 
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political attitudes. The part of the parties in promoting the religious cleavage has been 
relatively small, as the process began with radical demands of the Church, the 
Church's direct pressure on government and parties, and those, in turn, responded to 
the Church pressure69. The Church was promoting the religious political cleavage 
also by turning down the compromise solutions. When the parties of the left sought 
compromises70, the religious right fought against these proposals. When the 
compromise proposals were met with resistance, the left took more anti-clerical 
stand. 
2.2.2. Goals attained by the Church 
The strength of institutional and symbolical religion allowed the Catholic Church to 
make extremely radical demands. The Church raised following issues to the political 
arena: religious education, abortion, divorce laws, the influence of the Church over 
the Polish media and Church-State relationship. The Catholic Church tried originally 
even to push for the restoration of Catholicism as the official state religion of 
Poland71. 
Giving support to its political allies, Church “won” most of its goals already during 
the first years after transition. In 1989 Church supported Solidarity and received 
rights to build all kinds of facilities, including hospitals and radio stations, rights to 
operate private schools and seminaries, there was also started the procedure of the 
restitution of confiscated Church properties. In 1990 de facto mandatory Catholic 
 
69 Eberts 1998:837; Zarycki 2000:860 
70 For example, the Democratic Left Alliance compromised with the religious right over the treatment 
of religious issues in the Constitution (Curry 1997:77). 
71 Ramet 1998:294 
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religious instruction was introduced into public schools, in 1991 the Church 
succeeded in obtaining a tightening of divorce laws.72
The Church had opposed the 1956 liberal abortion law for decades, but their call for a 
ban on abortion became a politically important question only when its allies gained 
representation in the Polish parliament. Mainly with the help of Christian-National 
Union a tough anti-abortion law was enforced in 1993, which was liberalized in 1996 
by anti-clerical parties, but the new right-of-center parliament, elected in September 
1997, voted to return the law to its 1993 version73. The influence of the Church has 
led to one of the strictest anti-abortion laws in Europe with a result that annual figure 
of abortions in Poland is now about 150, while during the communist era, there were 
about 180,000 legal abortions every year74. Abortion law remained an important 
political issue even after the parliamentary elections of 2001, as the victorious 
Democratic Left Party favors relaxing the existing rules on abortions75.  
From the beginning of democratization the Church made also an effort to expand its 
influence into the field of communications and mass media. Before the Second World 
War the circulation of Catholic press accounted for about 30% of the total press 
circulation in Poland76. The Church uses a wide range of media canals also today. 
The political influence of the Catholic radio station Radio Maryja has been 
considerable especially in 1997 election77. Besides religious media, the Church wants 
to set the norms also for the whole Polish media. The political allies of the Church 
 
72 Ibid.; Demerath 2000:129 
73 Korbonski 2000:126-128; Eberts 1998:823-826; Chan 2000:183 
74 Ray Furlong. Poland set for abortion battle. BBC News, Wednesday, October 3, 2001.  
75 Ibid.  
76 Korbonski 2000:129 
77 It has been claimed to be responsible for the victory of AWS in 1997 parliamentary elections 
(Korbonski 2000:131). In 1997 Radio Maryja fielded its own candidates in the parliamentary 
elections, but year later the candidates of that radio station split from AWS (Gluchowski 1999:74). 
Radio Maryja has roughly 3 million listeners and has demonstrated its ability to mobilise its followers 
against an ever-increasing number of perceived enemies, which include besides drug abuse, 
pornography and abortion, also liberalism, EU and NATO (Gluchowski 1999:70; Smolar 1998:132; 
Lewis 2001:11). 
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passed in 1992 a law regulating radio and television in Poland, which demanded, that 
programs should respect religious feelings of their audiences and respect the system 
of Christian values78.  
Church-state relationship 
In 1989 the parliament passed laws that gave a new basis for church-state 
relationships and supplied the Church with legal rights and state subsidies79. The two 
main documents that define the legal status of the Catholic Church in Poland are the 
Concordat (signed in 1993 and ratified in 1998) and the Constitution (1997)80.  
The Concordat strengthened further the position of the Church both in society and in 
relationship with the state. It declares that the State and Catholic Church are 
independent and autonomous and both will cooperate for the development of 
mankind and of the common good. The Concordat also expanded the obligations of 
state to support the Church financially and ensured and reinforced the privileged 
status of the Church with many provisions.81  
The final version of the Polish Constitution is a document of political compromise 
that incorporates many of the Church's demands, but not all82. Like the Church 
wanted, the preamble of the Constitution mentions God as a source of the truth, 
justice, goodness and beauty, but also mentions non-believers, who may derive these 
universal values from other sources. The preamble refers to the Christian heritage of 
 
78 Korbonski 2000:128; Eberts 1998:831 
79 The 1989 laws guaranteed state finances for covering a large share of the social insurance costs of 
the clergy, Church’s autonomy from the state, provided the Church with tax and customs exemptions, 
including property tax release, legal regulations were made for restitution of Church properties (Eberts 
1998:820).  
80 The Concordat between the Holy See and Poland was signed by pro-Church government in 1993, 
but due to the change of government coalition, it was ratified only on April 24, 1998 (Korbonski 
2000:137; Mazurkiewicz 1999:4). Polish Constitution was passed by the National Assembly in April 
1997, and approved by citizens in a referendum in May of the same year (Eberts 1998:832-833). 
81 Eberts 1998:834 
82 Enstad 2000:141 
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the Polish Nation, but does not point to Catholicism or the Church specifically. 
According to Article 25 of the Constitution, the Polish state is religiously and 
ideologically neutral.  
In 1989 Poland got relatively permissive law for registration of the religious groups 
(passed still under Communist government). However, the laws for registration of 
religious groups were tightened in 1998. The law of 1989 required fifteen Polish 
founding signatures for legal registration of religious groups, the law of 1998 requires 
at least 100 Polish founding signatures83. With the help of pro-Church government, 
the Catholic Church managed to limit the entry of newcomers to the religious market. 
2.2.3. Access of the Church to the government 
The Catholic Church managed to gain its goals regarding social norms and values 
very quickly and had vast impact on political decision-making process. Yet it is 
remarkable that the gains of the Church come from the time when it had its political 
allies forming a government. The gains of the Church in the field of Church-State 
relationship and regulation of religious market delayed because of the fact that anti-
clerical parties formed the government between 1993-1997. 
The political influence of the Church was clearly dependent on the political allies, 
when the allies of the Church lost governmental power, also the Church lost some of 
its influence together with them. But as most of the goals of the Church were 
fulfilled, and as even the left-wing governing coalitions were only partly able to 
ignore the interests of the Church, the total level of the access to the government is 
counted as strong. 
 
83 Luxmoore 1999 
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Table 2. Poland. Variables and indicators of religion in politics 
Variable Nature and value of the indicators Value of 
the 
variable 
Religion is a strong indicator of voting preference and 
party identification (4) 
Religion is a basis of government coalition formation, 
but not the most important one (4) 
Religious 
political 
cleavage 
The religious political cleavage overlaps with other 
cleavages, but is not the dominant cleavage (4) 
Strong (4) 
Restitution of property was started in 1989 in a 
favorable way for the Church (5) 
Religious instruction solved in a favorable way for the 
Church 1990 (5) 
Divorce laws were tightened in 1991 (5) 
Religious censorship of media. Issue was settled in 
1992, but remained controversial (4) 
Tough abortion laws (1993 and 1997) (5)  
Liberal law of 1989 for registration of Churches was 
changed into a more restrictive one in 1998 (5) 
Goals 
attained by 
the Church 
Concordat (1998) and Constitution (1997) did not 
fulfill all expressed wishes of the Church, but enlarged 
the privileges of the Church (5) 
Very 
strong (5)  
Access to the 
government 
The Church depends on the political allies, but had 
indirect influence also on the decisions of the anti-
clerical governments. 
Strong (4) 
Values for the indicators of the goals attained by the Church: 5 points are given if the issue was solved 
favorably for the Church, 4 points are given if the issue was solved basically favorably for the Church 
but with restrictions, 3 points are given for the compromise solution, 2 points are given for the issue 
that was solved unfavorably for the Church, but the Church had some influence over decisions and its 
interests were not ignored totally, 1 point is given for an issue that was solved unfavorably for the 
Church. 
2.3. Church’s strategies 
Radical Christian strategy 
Party politics started with the parliamentary elections of 1991, as earlier the political 
confrontation was mostly between Solidarity and Communist Party. Since the 
Catholic Church in Poland is strong and right-wing parties have been relatively 
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numerous, there are many political allies of the Church. There were created Christian 
parties84, but also many other parties were willing to make use of the resource of 
religion made available by the Catholic Church85. The Christian parties were 
defending the radical claims of the Church and the Church chose to give its main 
support to them in the elections of 1991 and 1993.  
Table 3. Parliamentary elections in Poland 1991-1997 
Election year 1991 1993 1997 
 Votes
(%) 
Seats Votes
(%) 
Seats Votes 
(%) 
Seats 
Pro-Church lists: 
NSZZ Solidarity (NSZZ) 5.05 27 4.9 - AWS 
Peasant Alliance (PL) 5.46 28 0.37 - AWS 
Catholic Electoral Action (WAK) 8.73 49 - - AWS 
Central Democratic Alliance (POC) 8.71 44 - - AWS 
Christian Democracy (ChD) 2.36 5   AWS 
Catholic Electoral Committee: ‘Fatherland’   6.37 - AWS 
Union of Poland-Central Alliance (ZP-PC)   4.42 - AWS 
Coalition for Republic (KdR)   2.70 - AWS 
Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS)     33.83 201 
Mov. for Reconstruction of Poland (ROP)     5.56 6 
Total 31.42 157 20.76 - 39.39 207 
Lists having both clerical and anti-clerical elements: 
Polish Peasant Party (PSL) 8.67 48 15.40 132 7.31 27 
Democratic Union (UD) 12.31 62 10.59 74 - - 
Confederation for Independent Poland 
(KPN) 
7.50 46 5.77 22 - - 
Nonpartisan Block for Reforms (BBWR)   5.41 16   
Freedom Union (UW)     13.37 60 
Total 28.48 156 37.17 244 20.68 87 
Anti-clerical lists: 
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) 11.98 60 20.41 171 27.13 164 
Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD) 7.48 37 3.99 0   
Party ‘X’ 0.47 3 3.99 0   
Labour Solidarity (SP) 2.05 4     
Democratic-Social Movement (RDS) 0.46 1     
Labour Union (UP)   7.28 41 4.95 0 
Total 21.97 105 34.42 212 32.08 164 
Others: 18.13 42 7.65 4 6.28 2 
Sejm (Lower House) size  460  460  460 
Source: Chan 2000:182, with modifications 
                                                 
84 Enstad 2000:145 
85 For example, The Union of Poland-Central Alliance (ZP-PC) recognised the importance of the 
Catholic Church in Polish politics, but they did not make Christian moral issues and values critical to 
their programs and they maintained some distance from the church hierarchy (Michta 1997:94). 
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In the election of 1991 abortion became the most important electoral issue and the 
bishops urged all Catholics to judge each candidate based on her or his attitude 
toward the protection of the unborn86. The Church had both radical positions and 
chose to support more Christian-radical parties. Main representative of the Christian 
parties was the Christian National Union (ZChN), which stood for the 
appropriateness of the theology of the Catholic Church for politics and traditional 
political values such as nation, family and religion87. Pro-Church group of parties 
included also some Christian Democratic parties that were less clerical-confessional 
in content. The major Christian Democratic party in Poland was in the beginning of 
1990s the Centre Alliance (PC), which also has been a member of the Christian 
Democratic International88.  
The main political allies of the Church were Christian-radicals. The Church even 
organized a coalition the Catholic Electoral Action, which openly supported radical 
Christian party (ZChN) and its allies. This strategy proved to be a success, as parties 
endorsed by the Catholic Electoral Action gained enough seats in the parliament to 
become an attractive partner in any coalition government. Between 1991 and 1993 
there were governments in favor of Church’ interests89.  
In the 1993 parliamentary election Christian or Christian Democratic parties gained 
no seat in the Sejm, because the parties of the rightist camp were torn apart by 
ideological differences and splintered into a plethora of groupings too small to win 
 
86 Eberts 1998:828 
87 Chan 1999:12; Michta 1997:93. Mixing traditional Christian values with national sentiments ZChN 
became soon the principal spokesman of the Christian right in Poland, led by individuals who 
proclaimed themselves in favour of various policies advocated by the church. (Korbonski 2000:139) 
88 Crawford 1996:236. In the beginning of 2002, no Polish party belonged to Christian Democratic 
International. 
89 Beyme 1996:137 
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seats in the Sejm according to the new and more restricting electoral law90. Also the 
active interference of the Church to the politics had motivated the major left-wing 
parties to take more anti-clerical stand in their electoral programs of 199391. Only 
Democratic Union did comparatively well in 1993 with 10.6 percent of vote, because 
it did not operate in a clericalist way92. The Christian-radical strategy of the Church 
that worked well two year earlier, proved to be counter-productive in 1993, as no 
distinctly pro-Church parties gained seat in the Sejm. 
Moderate Christian strategy 
Poor electoral results in 1993 parliamentary elections forced Church and its political 
allies to a more rational collaboration. In 1994 Catholic and national-Catholic parties 
started to unite their forces, creating two federations of right-wing parties “Covenant 
for Poland”, and “Agreement of 11 November”93. In 1996 was formed Solidarity 
Electoral Action (AWS)94. The historical Solidarity vs. Communism division had 
provided AWS leaders with tremendously powerful symbols for mobilization95 and 
while the main competitor SLD was professedly secular, AWS was drawing on 
Christian traditions96 with emphasis on Catholic family values and fighting of moral 
decay in society97. The strategy of the Church in 1997 election was more moderate 
than before. First, the formation of the grand coalition AWS required a broad 
common program and in a way eliminated the strength of the extreme-clerical parties. 
Second, the Church also used more indirect canals of interference to the electoral 
contest and so the anti-clerical backlash was avoided. Before the elections the 
 
90 Chan 1999:12; Chan 2000:183 
91 Szczerbiak 1999:1401 
92 Beyme 1996:137 
93 Wesołowski 1996:233,237 
94 AWS was an electoral coalition of more than 30 right-wing groupings, where ZChN represented a 
strong clerical nationalist tendency, the Party of Christian Democrats (PChD) and Central Alliance 
(PC) were pro-market, pro-Europe Christian Democrats, other major groups were a conservative-
liberal group and a group connected with the trade union Solidarity (Chan 1999:14; Enstad 2000:153-
154). 
95 Chan 1999:15 
96 Szczerbiak 1999:1406 
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Episcopate issued a communiqué in which it urged Poles to take part in the election, 
but it cautioned that the mission of the Church could not be tied to any specific 
political party, although essential political neutrality of the Church was still out of 
question98. 
The pro-Church AWS won the most votes, 33.83%, and obtained 201 seats in the 
Sejm. Although the AWS formed a coalition government with the less-clerical 
center-right Freedom Union (UW), the Church was pleased with the election 
results99.  
From radical to radical-moderate 
The radical style of the Church has brought Church to the position where it is no 
longer an unquestionable moral and political authority100. The Church rejected any 
compromise in vital moral questions101, but when certain compromise results were 
later achieved, the Church sometimes decided to stop fighting while the results were 
not the best possible solution for the Church. So, in a way, the Church has taken into 
account the objective circumstances. It did not continue to fight the ratified 
Constitution, which in many ways did not fulfill the demands of the Church102. The 
Church does not fight also the 1998 abortion law, which restricts the availability of 
abortion, but does not fulfill the Church’s demand of total ban of abortion103.  
 
97 Chan 1999:14; Enstad 2000:153-154 
98 Chan 2000:187 
99 Eberts 1998:831  
100 Bruce 1999:273; Chan 2000:177; Korbonski 2000:125,145; Król 1999: 73 
101 The Church has stated that when moral principles and the opinion of the people disagree, the 
former should prevail (Chan 2000:185). In 1993, when restrictive abortion law was in force, 58.2% of 
respondents opposed the Church's position on abortion, and only 33.2% supported it (Eberts 
1998:825). 
102 Yet earlier the pope, the church and its allies, especially Radio Maryja, went all out to defeat the 
constitutional draft, approved by an overwhelming majority in parliament (Korbonski 2000:138,141). 
103 The liberalised abortion law from 1996 received harsh criticism from the Church, the Primate and 
the Pope (Chan 2000:183,185; Eberts 1998:824-825).  
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The electoral defeat of its allies in 1993 forced the Church to choose more moderate 
political style that brought success in 1997. But the strategic choice of the Church to 
remain officially neutral and not to support only one party, has been one reason why 
there still is neither strong Christian nor strong Christian Democratic party in Poland. 
As a consequence the right-of-center parties are in constant competition for the 
support of the Church104. Another cause of the division among rightwing parties is 
found in the radical goals of the Church that have inspired the radical Churchmen and 
radical Christian parties105.  
2.4. Discussion 
The political religious cleavage is weaker than the social religious cleavage in 
Poland, because the radical demands and Christian strategy of the Church have 
brought along a political religious cleavage that is biased towards anti-clericalism 
(i.e. weakened). The radical demands and Christian strategy brought success to the 
Church’ allies in the parliamentary election of 1991, but did not bring any success 
later. The radical positions have given the Church a high level of fulfilled goals, but 
also have provoked too strong anti-clerical backlash and electoral defeat for the 
political allies of the Church in 1993 election. In order to regain its access to the 
government, the Church choose a bit more moderate demands, and more moderate 
political allies in the 1997 election. The Church regained its access to the government 
and more of its goals were gained, but in the political competition of parties the 
religious political cleavage was not ‘frozen’ as a dominant organizer of political 
parties. 
 
104 Voltmer 1999:10; Marczewska-Rytko 2001. The AWS (which was under direct influence of the 
Church) brought political victory to the Church in 1997, but remained very loose coalition that began 
soon to split. In 1997 Lech Wałęsa founded a new party, Christian Democracy of Poland, Solidarity 
leader Marian Krzaklewski created another party, Social Movement-AWS (Chan 2000:189; Smolar 
1998:124,125).  
105 Chan 2000:183,193; Korbonski 2000:142; Ramet 1998:306 
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Chapter 3. Hungary 
3.1. Religion in society 
3.1.1. Institutional religion 
According to surveys the religiosity of Hungarians declined in the first Communist 
decades, but there has been a steady growth in religiosity since the late 1970s106. 
While the number of religious persons has reached two-thirds of the total population 
in 1990s107, only about one sixth describe themselves as “religious according to the 
Church teaching”108, which is about as much as there are practicing religious 
people109.  
Overwhelming majority of Hungarians trust the churches110, support the idea that 
financial support should be restricted only to historical churches111, and has liberal 
attitude regarding abortion112. As the clericalism/anti-clericalism divide deepened in 
 
106 Schanda 1999:13 
107 According to the European Values Study Surveys of 1999 57.1% of Hungarians claim to belong a 
religious denomination (Halman 2001:74).  
108 Dobszay 1996; Enyedi 2000b:160; Luxmoore 1999 
109 According to the European Values Study Surveys of 1999 17.5% of respondents claimed to visit 
the Church more than once a month (Halman 2001:78). 
110 Schanda 1999:14. The high level of trust has decreased, in 1998, 30 per cent expressed distrust in 
churches, as opposed to 22 per cent in 1991 (Enyedi 2000b:161). 
111 According to 1997 survey 16.4% disagreed with any financial support given to Churches, 36% 
proposed that all Churches should be supported, and 76.8% wanted to restrict this support to historical 
Churches. There is a public support for treating the Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist and Jewish 
denominations differently from the rest (Enyedi 2000a:10). 
112 According to the ISSP data from 1991 and 1998 Zsolt Enyedi found that about four-fifths of 
Hungarians stated that it is ‘never wrong’ to carry out abortion for health reasons and about half of 
them accept poverty as a legitimate reason for an abortion (Enyedi 2000b:161). 
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the political arena, also the public attitude became more critical regarding the 
political activity of the Church113. There are relatively few those who believe in 
religious dogmas but the sensibility towards the existence of supernatural phenomena 
has considerably increased and fundamental religious concepts have gained 
widespread acceptance114.  
3.1.2. Symbolical religion 
Hungary received Catholicism in the year 1000115, but starting from Reformation it 
became and remained a multi-confessional country. Protestantism provided local 
nobility with the opportunity to distance themselves from the Habsburg emperors 
who in turn were closely linked with the Catholic Church116. The emphasis in the 
early stages of the Counter-Reformation was placed on persuasion117 and by the end 
of the sixteenth century only about one-tenth of the population remained Catholic118. 
Following Counter-Reformation never managed to Catholicize the country119. 
There has been a long tradition of close co-operation between the church and the state 
in Hungary. The Church received financial support from the state and in turn the 
appointments to the highest offices of the Church needed the approval of the 
government120. The number of churches in co-operation with the state increased 
during the centuries. In the first part of the 19th century the Catholic, Lutheran, 
 
113 In 1991, 13 per cent regarded the churches as being too powerful, in 1998 the respective figure was 
21 per cent. The number of those who accept as legitimate the churches’ influence on voters decreased 
from 15 per cent to 8 per cent. (Enyedi 2000b:161). 
114 The proportions of those who believe in life after death, heaven, hell, miracles and personal God 
grew between 1991 and 1998 (Enyedi 2000a:162). 
115 Gautier 1998; Mojzes 1999 
116 Mojzes 1999; Gautier 1998 
117 Ramet 1998:104 
118 Mojzes 1999; Gautier 1998 
119 Protestants were persecuted, but the confrontation did not escalate into military conflict like it 
happened in Bohemia. In 1880 Catholics made up only 56.14 percent of Hungary’s population; most 
of the remainder were Protestants. (Ramet 1998:105) 
120 Enyedi 2000a:5 
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Calvinist and (since 1790) the Orthodox Churches were considered co-opted121. In 
1895 religious freedom was proclaimed for all, yet the public worship was restricted 
to the co-opted Churches (the Catholic, Orthodox, Reformed, Lutheran, Jewish and 
Unitarian Churches)122. These mainstream churches remained part of the 
establishment until 1948123. While the Catholic Church remained a “quasi-
established” Church, as all its responsible appointments had to be approved by the 
government124, all the privileged religious communities were pleased with that order 
of Church-state relations125. 
The idea of a Hungarian nation has been closely linked to religion, but there still is a 
competition over the matter which one is the proper religion of Hungarians126. After 
Hungary gained autonomy in 1867 the Catholic Church ceased legally to be a state 
religion and until the First World War Hungarian Protestant nationalism 
dominated127. The Catholic Church gained its privileged social-political status mostly 
because the aristocracy was largely Catholic, the history of the monarchy was 
strongly associated with Catholicism and the Catholic Church had a close alliance 
with the government128. Protestantism gained its symbolic power through its 
association with national (anti-Catholic) freedom fights, 19th century liberalism, 
emphasis on national values and national character, important political position in the 
 
121 Enyedi 2000a:9 
122 Ibid. 
123 Schanda, 1999:15 
124 Ramet 1998:106-107 
125 Mojzes 1999 
126 At the end of the year 2001, the leader of the Justice and Life party, Calvinist Istvan Csurka, stated 
that the Calvinist church is the true voice of "Hungarian" religion, a historic repository of national 
feeling. (Christians At Odds. Economist, p. 59, December 12, 2001) 
127 Ramet 1998:107; Enyedi 2000a:3 
128 The Roman Catholics were always the most numerous religious community and were also the most 
closely aligned with the government. The Catholic bishop of Esztergom held the rank of prince and 
was second only to the king in political power. The Catholic Church was the greatest landholder in 
Hungary; it controlled more than half of all schools and had the power to mandate obligatory religious 
instruction for all children. In the end of 1940 forty-eight religious leaders, of whom fourteen 
archbishops held their offices by “right of birth”, represented the churches in Parliament. (Gautier 
1998) 
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inter-war period and also by the fact that Transsylvania, the central symbol of 
Hungarian nationalism after 1918, was associated with Protestantism as well129. 
Interwar authoritarian, conservative regime re-established the state-dependent nature 
of the Churches through financial supervision130. The government gave Churches 
extensive support, favored the Catholic Church, discouraged anticlericalism, and 
made religious instruction a compulsory subject in state schools131. The efforts of 
Hungarianizing of the religious communities motivated the Hungarian religious 
hierarchy originally to support the nation's alliance with Nazi Germany132. 
Although the churches in Hungary were repressed by the communist regime133, the 
tradition of close co-operation between church and state was soon re-established. The 
uncompromising leaders of Catholic, Reformed and Lutheran Churches were arrested 
or forced to resign134. Remaining clergy accepted the reforms. Communists 
succeeded in reshaping the ideologies of the Catholic, Calvinist and Lutheran 
churches135.  
 
129 Enyedi 2000a:10 
130 Enyedi 2000a:3; Bozóki 1999:105 
131 Ramet 1998:108 
132 There was also a federation of Catholic organizations called the Catholic Social People's Movement 
that resisted to the Nazi presence in Hungary. Eventually this movement became the Christian 
Democratic People's Party and played a small part in the post-war coalition government. (Gautier 
1998) 
133 Church and state became separated, most Church social organizations were banned, independent 
Catholic press was suppressed, Church lost most of its educational facilities, thousands of monks and 
nuns were in prisons and tortured (Ramet 1998:109). 
134 Ramet 1998:109; Gautier 1998 
135 The first agreement between the Catholic Church and state was signed in 1950 (Gautier 1998), in 
the same year an ecclesiastical "peace movement" backed by the state was organized within the 
Catholic church of Hungary (Ramet 1998:109). Both the Reformed and Lutheran churches subscribed 
to the so-called Theology of Diakonia, which stressed that church is to be at the service of the state 
(Ramet 1998:6). 
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After 1956 the organizing principle of Church-State relations became one of 
“Dialogue”136, which involved the public support of the regime by religious 
authorities and the limiting of church activities to spiritual matters137. 
Step-by-step the co-operation between state and church became enhanced138, there 
was the elite level co-operation between bishops and the state139, and the clergy were 
bound by an oath of allegiance to the Hungarian constitution140. Eventually the 
Church-state relations became even more cooperative in the 1976, when Laszlo Lekai 
became Primate of Hungary141 instead of troublesome former Primate Jozsef 
Mindszenty. 
Church members became alienated from their religious leaders142, as the state 
approved hierarchy of Churches had to see to it that politically non-conformist 
clergymen were silenced and cut off from their flock143, but the Catholic Church got 
also the positive chance to re-establish its national organization, to reclaim its 
privileges, and thus threaten the advances made by the Protestant Churches in the 
Hungarian religious market in the first decades of Communism144.  
The Churches were not the main force behind the revolutionary changes during 
transition from Communist regime145. The Churches, however, still turned out to be 
the largest forces of civil society146. Idea of Hungarian nationalism was closely linked 
 
136 Enyedi 2000a:3; Enyedi 2000b:160 
137 Enyedi 2000b:160 
138 During Janos Kadar’s rule the Catholic Church enjoyed the protection of the state, was still able to 
operate eight high schools, and did not have to worry about harassment or obstruction by the 
authorities (Ramet 1998:91). 
139 Ramet 1998:111; Enyedi 2000a:9 
140 According to the agreement with Vatican in 1964, the clergy were bound by an oath and the state 
had a right to veto any appointee in the appointment of bishops (Dobszay 1996). 
141 Ramet 1998:110 
142 Gautier 1998 
143 Tökés 1997:113 
144 Bruce 1999:273 
145 The revolutionary changes were mostly the work of reform communists (Gautier 1998). 
146 Schanda, 1999:16 
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to religion, but not to one religion only. The Hungarian state was never completely 
identified with Catholicism because of the presence and the political weight of 
Protestant communities and by the Catholicism of the Hapsburg dynasty147.  
Religion and ethnicity were among the most important political issues during the 
inter-war years. This in turn helped these non-economical issues to become also the 
symbolical center of the post-communist politics.  
Table 4. Hungary. Indicators of the religion in society 
Indicator Nature Value 
Strength of 
institutional 
religion 
There is a high level of religious affiliation and 
middle level of religious attendance in Hungary 
Strong 
(4) 
Strength of 
symbolical 
religion 
National identity is closely linked to Catholicism 
and Calvinism. Privileges of the traditional 
churches are seen as legitimate. Historical tradition 
of co-operation between Church and state. Co-
operation with Communist regime discredited the 
Churches. 
Strong 
(4) 
Clerical/anti-
clerical 
cleavage 
The social conflict over clericalism tends to be 
biased towards favoring the privileges of the 
traditional churches 
Strong 
(4) 
Religious-
secular 
cleavage 
Relatively few those who are religious according to 
Church doctrine 
Middle 
(3) 
3.2. Religion in politics 
3.2.1. Religious political cleavage 
The active role of Churches in public debates over politicized religious issues have 
provoked a mixed reaction and have politicized the religious divisions in Hungary to 
such an extent that today religiosity and clericalism are major predictors of party 
                                                 
147 Enyedi 2000a:9 
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affiliation148. Although the religious vote is dispersed among all parties149, the 
mainstream religiosity and active membership in the established Churches is 
associated with the right-wing political block150.  
In 1991 the electorate of the Christian Democratic Party (KDNP) was significantly 
more religious than all the other constituencies. While the relationship between party 
preference and religiosity declined since 1991, the relative weight of religiosity has in 
fact increased as by 1998 clerical attitudes became thoroughly politicized. Party 
politics did not penetrate the realm of values closely linked to the social teaching of 
the Churches (family values, views on abortion), but became more centered on the 
clericalism issue151.  
As the different issue dimensions tend to overlap, the inter-party distances on 
nationalist, religious, etc. issues tend to be the same152. Religion was also a basis for 
the government coalition formation in all three electoral periods153, and the coalition-
opposition relationship was perceived as religious-secular cleavage, later 
clericalism/anti-clericalism cleavage. For example between 1990 and 1994 all the 
parties in the government coalitions were in the authoritarian, religious, anti-
Communist, and nationalist sector of the dominant competitive space, but they 
differed in their positions regarding economic issues154. The rationale for the 
coalition was not their common program, nor the mutual sympathies of their voters, 
 
148 Enyedi 2000a:1,17. Zsolt Enyedi found according to ISSR 1991 and 1998 surveys an increasingly 
strong relationship between religiosity and clericalism and views on abortion (Enyedi 2000b:159). 
149 Tökés 1997:142-143 
150 Enyedi 2000b:157; Flere 2001:196 
151 Enyedi 2000b:172 
152 Enyedi 2000a:18; Enyedi, 2000b:157; Tóka 1997. Starting from 1990 the institutional-ideological 
cleavage of Christian ethics, anti-communism, and rural attitudes was represented by the conservative 
center-right and right-wing political parties and voters; anticlerical, pro-urban and right-wing political 
parties were on the same platform on the other side (Kowalik 2002:9). 
153 After 1994 election the social-democratic MSZP formed a coalition government with the left-
liberal SZDSZ, the party which was probably the closest to the MSZP on non-economic issues, but 
was at the same time probably the most pro-market formation among all Hungarian parties (Enyedi, 
2000a:157).  
154 Markowski 1997:242 
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but the contention that only they formed the Christian-National camp155. Not 
surprisingly, their opposition took an anti-clerical stand. 
The parliament members held clericalism in 1998 not as the most important, but still 
as the most “divisive” issue156. Clericalism was one of the most important 
determinants of the parties’ overall ideological position157, and so religion divided 
partisan camps in Hungary in a stronger way than in Poland158.  
3.2.2. Goals attained by the Church 
In post-communist Hungary there have been serious political disputes over restitution 
of Church properties confiscated by the Communists, the politically constructed 
denominational hierarchies (the privileges of four “historical” Churches over the rest 
of the denominations), the annual finance of Churches, religious education and 
abortion. 
The Church did not gain the maximum goal of the compulsory religious education. In 
the fall of 1990 religious education was offered in public schools on a voluntary 
basis, although the teachers are paid by the Hungarian state159. The traditional 
Churches got large benefit from the new law, as in the 1990-1991 school year 
religious education became available in public schools with seventeen thousand 
classes for Catholics, five thousand for members of the Reformed Church, sixteen 
hundred classes for Lutherans, and forty-three for Jews160.  
 
155 Enyedi 2000b:164 
156 Enyedi 2000a:19 
157 Ibid. p.24 
158 Tóka 1997 
159 Gagnere 1993  
160 Rosalie Beck and David W. Hendon (1991) “Notes on Church-State affairs: Hungary”, Journal of 
Church & State, 2:384 
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The abortion issue was settled in 1992 when Hungarian parliament passed quite 
moderate abortion law161. 
Restitution of confiscated property 
The Hungarian government concluded an agreement with Vatican and later with 
other denominations on their property claims. Most of the denominations opted for a 
financial compensation paid every year instead of getting back all the buildings they 
were entitled to. The deadline for the restitution was extended until 2011, and the 
procedure of restitution is still raising some difficulties.162
Return of Church property came to a standstill while the pro-Church coalition 
government (1990-1994) was still in office. Of the 7127 claims submitted, in only 
about 1500 cases was property actually transferred before 1994163.  
Regulation of religious market  
In 1990 a new law concerning religion ended state interference in Church affairs164, 
and established the principle of equality and state neutrality165. Other regulations, 
however, do establish differences166. The main religious conflict in Hungarian 
political arena is about the rights of the traditional and privileged Churches against 
 
161 It allows women to have an abortion if either the pregnant woman or, the fetus has life-threatening 
health problems, if the woman is the victim of rape, or if the woman says that the pregnancy has 
caused a serious crisis for her. The law requires the woman to consult with a committee of unspecified 
composition before having the abortion. (Rosalie Beck and David W. Hendon (1993) “Notes on 
Church-State Affairs: Hungary”, Journal of Church & State, 2:440) 
162 Schanda, 1999:17 
163 Dobszay 1996 
164 Ramet 1998:112 
165 As a consequence of extremely liberal law for registration of the new Churches, there was 
registered unexpectedly large number of churches (Schanda, 1999:17). 
166 Privileged denominations can send their delegates to the public TV and radio boards, army 
chaplaincy was set up only for four historical denominations in 1994. The special governmental 
committee on Church-State relationships (established at the end of 1999) is also composed exclusively 
of the delegates of the four “historical” Churches. (Enyedi 2000a:10) 
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the rights of new and minority religious groups167. Even ten years after the transition 
to democracy, the issue of equality vs. inequality of the denominations is still on the 
agenda168. There are many small and new denominations, although their actual size in 
the population is small (around two percent). The most prominent of them is the Faith 
Church169.  
Also the parties are involved in the conflict. Right of center political parties tend to 
support the privileges of the historical churches, left-liberal parties favor the “strict 
neutrality” approach and are opposed to the establishment of any hierarchy among 
the Churches170. 
Political-religious debates in 1999 and 2000 were centered on Faith Church171, the 
pro-historical church government was eager to defend the historical Churches172 by 
being willing to legalize more restrictive law on registration of Churches173 that 
would discriminate against the Faith Church and would leave the historical Churches 
untouched.  
The church-state relationship in Hungary can be called co-operative separation. The 
state has the duty to provide Churches with the means that are necessary for their 
 
167 Enyedi 2000a:10,13 
168 Enyedi 2000a:2 
169 The charismatic-evangelical, Pentecostal denomination Faith Church, was established in 1979, and 
has around 35.000 members. The Church is strongly anti-Catholic, claiming that the policies of the 
pro-historical church government are manipulated by Vatican. (Enyedi 2000a:11) 
170 The strict neutrality approach sees in the (pro-historical church) government initiatives an attempt 
at re-establishing the pre-war feudal relationships between politics and religion, where none of them 
could develop full autonomy. (Enyedi 2000a:17) 
171 The MPs criticized the community for practicing anathema against their enemies, for worshiping 
financial success, for making racist remarks against Arabs, for making controversial statements like 
that Hitler and Mussolini were the pupils of the Catholic Church, etc. The right-wing MPs repeatedly 
asked the Free Democrats to distance themselves from the Faith Church. (ibid. pp. 12-13) 
172 The possibility for the Faith Church to participate in army chaplaincy through the Protestant 
chaplaincy, a practice existing since 1996, was denied in 1999 (Enyedi 2000a:13). 
173 The conservative coalition government elected in 1998 wanted to limit registration to those 
churches that have at least 10,000 members and have been active in Hungary for at least one hundred 
years (David W. Hendon; Dwight D. Allman and Donald E. Greco (1999) “Notes on Church-State 
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operation174, and the Churches are clearly favored over non-religious associations. 
There is very liberal legal regulation of religious activity175. Since the tax year 1997, 
taxpayers can offer 1% of their income tax to registered churches. In the secularized 
Hungarian society only slightly more than ten percent of the taxpayers donate one 
percent of their income tax to Churches176. Since 1989 the amount of financial 
assistance to the Churches depended on the conditions of the budget and on the will 
of the parliamentary majority177. There has been conflict between non-conformist and 
traditional Churches over the financial subsidies of the state178. The socialist-liberal 
coalition government (1994-1998) did not change the system of financing the 
Churches, although every year there were renewed disputes about how much the state 
should allot to the Churches179.  
3.2.3. Access of the Church to the government 
Like in Poland, the political influence of the Church was dependent on the political 
allies (the government was formed by the pro-Church parties in 1990-1994 and 1998-
2002), but the actual level of the influence of the Church on even the pro-Church 
government decisions remained smaller than in the case of Poland, as the allies of the 
Church were less eager to defend its interests. At the same time the Church 
influenced indirectly also the decisions of the left-wing governing coalitions. The 
total level of the access to the government is counted as middle. 
 
Affairs: Hungary”, Journal of Church & State, 4:856). These plans of the Hungarian government were 
highly criticised by the European Union officials in 1999 (Enyedi 2000a:16). 
174 Enyedi 2000a:5-6 
175 Ibid. p. 6. The Churches have an almost absolute autonomy in financial issues: the state may not 
control the management of the Churches’ funds. The Churches have the right to establish educational 
institutions, to organize religious instruction in state schools, are exempted from paying local taxes etc.  
176 Enyedi 2000a:7 
177 Enyedi 2000b:164 
178 Enyedi 2000a:7 
179 Dobszay 1996; Luxmoore 1999 
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Table 5. Hungary. Variables and indicators of religion in politics 
Variable Nature and value of the indicators Value of 
the 
variable 
Religion is the strongest indicator of voting preference 
and party identification (5) 
Religion is an important basis of government coalition 
formation (5) 
Religious 
political 
cleavage 
Non-economic cleavages overlap (5) 
Very 
strong 
(5) 
Compromise solution has been reached regarding the 
restitution of Church’ property (3) 
Religious instruction (1990) is offered on voluntary 
basis (4) 
Moderate abortion law (1992) (2) 
Four historical denominations are legally privileged. 
They have not succeeded to gain more restrictive law 
for registration of religious groups (4) 
Goals 
attained by 
the Church 
The principle of ‘co-operative separation’ characterizes 
church-state relationship. Yet financial assistance to 
Church depends partly on the will of parliamentary 
majority (4) 
Strong-
middle 
(3.5) 
Access to 
the 
government 
The Church depends on its political allies. Church’ 
influence on the decisions of government is not as 
strong as in Poland. 
Middle  
(3) 
Values for the indicators of the goals attained by the Church: 5 points are given if the issue was solved 
favorably for the Church, 4 points are given if the issue was solved basically favorably for the Church 
but with restrictions, 3 points are given for the compromise solution, 2 points are given for the issue 
that was solved unfavorably for the Church, but the Church had some influence over decisions and its 
interests were not ignored totally, 1 point is given for an issue that was solved unfavorably for the 
Church. 
3.3. Church’s strategies 
In the beginning of party politics the dominant attitude regarding the Church was 
positive. The left wing parties stressed their good will towards Churches while 
center-to-right parties posed as “good Christians”. The only notable political party 
that went on open conflict course with the traditional churches was the Alliance of 
Free Democrats, a left-wing liberal party that acted as an advocate of religious 
minorities. The center-to-right parties were the allies of traditional Churches in the 
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moral revival of the nation, and most of the political arena was receptive to the social 
services of churches.180
Table 6. Hungarian parties and distribution of percentage of list votes and 
number of seats in Hungarian parliamentary elections, 1945, 1947, 1990-1998 
 1945 1947 1990 1994 1998
FIDESZ: Alliance of Young 
Democrats, after 1994 Fidesz-MPP: 
Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Party 
- - 8.95 
(21) 
7.02 
(20) 
29.45
(148)
FKGP: Independent Smallholders’ 
Party, agrarian-conserv. 
57,0% 15,4% 11.73 
(44) 
8.82 
(26) 
13.14
(48)
KDNP: Christian Democratic 
People’s Party 
FKGP 16,4% 6.46 
(21) 
7.03 
(22) 
2.31
(-)
MDF: Hungarian Democratic Forum, 
conserv. 
- - 24.73 
(164) 
11.74 
(37) 
2.80
(17)
MIÉP: Party of Hungarian Justice 
and Life, nationalist 
- - - 1.59 
(-) 
5.47
(14)
MSZP: Hungarian Socialist Party, 
social-democrats 
17,4% 14,9% 10.89 
(33) 
32.99 
(209) 
32.89
(134)
SZDSZ: Alliance of Free Democrats, 
liberal  - -
21.39 
(92) 
19.74 
(70) 
7.57
(24)
Pro-Church parties are in bold shrift. By third election, the FIDESZ had changed its position of being 
anti-clerical to clerical. 
Mixed strategy 
The Church supported Christian and Christian Democratic parties in the first two 
elections and had a mixed strategy (Christian and Christian Democratic strategy). By 
third election it decidedly choose a Christian Democratic strategy and withdraw its 
support from a Christian party KDNP.  
KDNP is nominally Christian Democratic party, but essentially a Christian party181. 
Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) was recognized by the West European 
                                                 
180 Schanda, 1999:14 
181 KDNP may be even called the Catholic-sub-cultural party, as according to the survey from mid-
1990s 97 per cent of those who mentioned explicitly religious motives for voting, gave their vote for 
KDNP (Enyedi 2000b:167). 
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Christian democrats as their Hungarian sister party182 in the beginning of 1990s, since 
the MDF was much more ‘centrist’183. The 1991 electoral campaign of Hungarian 
Democratic Forum (MDF) was based on Hungary’s historic identity as a Christian 
and European nation184. Also FKGP should be considered as a Christian Democratic 
party, as its appeal was also moderate religious (in the 1990 election its motto was 
"God, Family and Fatherland"). 
The Church supported the coalition governments of FKGP, MDF and KDNP (1990-
1994), and in a number of cases the Prime Minister of the government turned for 
moral support to the traditional Churches—the Catholic, the Calvinist, and the 
Lutheran185. The policy towards the Churches of the pro-Church government between 
1990-1994 was rated as favorable, although not all the goals of the Church were 
fulfilled186. Also this ‘Christian-national block’ became fragmented, as MDF took on 
more Christian-radical rather than moderate centrist image and lost popular 
support187.  
The following socialist-liberal coalition government (1994-1998) did not change the 
privileges that the traditional Churches had gained earlier, but as far as new laws 
were concerned, it was more in favor of giving equal rights to the new and smaller 
churches.  
 
182 MDF still is a member party of Christian Democrat and People’s Parties International (The 
homepage of CDI/PPI, http://www.idc-cdi.org/parties/miembros_idc/Hungria_MDF.asp, accessed 
April 4, 2002). 
183 Crawford 1996:236. Also Gabor Tóka has found that MDF and FKGP had a much more complex 
appeal and they had more electoral support among irregular church-goers and the non-religious than 
the religious parties (Tóka 1996:111).  
184 Tökés 1997:118 
185 Dobszay 1996. Devoutly Catholic Prime Minister Jozsef Antall emphasized that the various 
churches and denominations of the country should participate in the program of National Renewal 
launched by the government (Gagnere 1993). 
186 Dobszay 1996 
187 Enyedi, 2000a:157 
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Christian-Democratic strategy 
As KDNP took more extremist position by 1998, the Church abandoned this party, 
and KDNP was not able to surpass the 5 per cent electoral threshold188. The Church 
supported more liberal party FIDESZ instead189. FIDESZ had changed its position on 
the religious-secular continuum during 1990s. In 1990 FIDESZ had been on anti-
clerical side, but became later less secular and less cosmopolitan on religious and 
national issues190. The new ally of the traditional Churches, FIDESZ, served them 
well – it elevated Christian politicians to government positions, and satisfied the 
requests of these Churches – whether material or symbolic in nature – almost without 
exception191.  
Moderate demands 
The traditional Churches choose Christian Democratic strategy to support parties 
with moderate religious appeal, and in accordance with it the Churches kept quite low 
profile and did not become as militant as the Catholic Church in Poland192. The 
moderate solution on abortion issue was not fought against vehemently. The strategy 
of not going to extremes proved also efficient in the choice of the allies.  
The Church supported the right-wing parties through all three elections. The Catholic 
Church expressed its right-wing sympathy through circulars issued before the 
elections without being directly linked up with any particular party, yet it called 
Christians to give their vote to the pro-Church parties193.  
 
188 Enyedi 2000b:167 
189 In the circular issued before the 1998 elections, the clergy asked the flock not to waste votes for 
small parties. This declaration was widely understood as the withdrawal of the support from the 
previous ally, the Christian Democrats (KDNP), and a positive gesture towards FIDESZ. (Enyedi 
2000a:5) 
190 Enyedi, 2000a:157 
191 Enyedi 2000b:166 
192 Gagnere 1993 
193 Dobszay 1996 
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Interestingly enough, the Church took away its support from parties that concentrated 
to the religious vote, took on a more extreme position and in that way, at least in 
principle, should have served the interests of religion and the Church in the best way. 
KDNP should have been the first choice of the Church, but wasn’t. The fact, that the 
Church withdrew support from parties that narrowed their electoral appeal to religion, 
proves most tellingly that Church in Hungary has acted rationally and has chosen 
strategy that serves best its interests.  
3.4. Discussion 
Partly because of international pressure, the traditional churches of Hungary have not 
gained a more restrictive law for registration of religious groups. Otherwise, the pro-
Church governments have met their need for resources, although the Church has not 
been able to have wide influence over the law-making, and especially moderate is the 
influence of the Church on the social norms and values. The main gains of the 
traditional Churches have been their legal privileges and financial assistance from 
state. 
But religion has become politically even more relevant than in Poland, and not 
because of widely held Christian beliefs or wide support of the Church dogmas and 
positions on abortion and other politically important moral issues. Even the high 
symbolical value that religion has cannot explain why the religious cleavage has 
become stronger in the Hungarian politics than in society. The symbolical strength of 
religion was an available resource to use for political mobilization, but the moderate 
claims of the Church, and later also the change of strategy from a mixture of 
Christian Democratic and Christian strategies to a Christian Democratic strategy 
avoided too strong anti-clerical backlash and so the religious political cleavage 
remained with the strongest level of polarization.  
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Chapter 4. The Czech Republic  
4.1. Religion in society 
4.1.1. Institutional religion 
There was a revival of interest in religion in the Czech Republic after the "Velvet 
Revolution" in 1989, but the number of those professing religious beliefs or 
participating in organized religion has fallen steadily since then194. In 1991 the 
number of atheists rose for the first time above those belonging to the Roman 
Catholic Church, the proportional ratio of religious affiliation remained more or less 
the same in 1990s195.  
Despite the obvious secularity and high number of atheists, the religious traditions 
have still a relevant place in society. There still exists a tradition of Christmas 
Christianity, even among those who do not have strong Christian beliefs196. Like in 
 
194 In an opinion poll of 1999 only 35 percent claimed to believe in a higher spiritual power, and 64 
percent identified themselves as atheists (U.S. Department of State (2000) “The Czech Republic”). 
According to European Values Study of 1999 11.7% visit Church more than once a month, 33.6% 
belongs to religious denomination, 38.9% believe in God, 17.5% prays at least once a week (Halman 
2001:78,74,86,98). 
195 The 1991 Czechoslovak census results for religion reported the following amounts of members and 
population percentages: 39.7 without confession, 39.2% Roman Catholic, 16.2% uncertain, 1.9% 
Czech Brethren, 1.7% Czechoslovak Hussite, other 1.3% (Clark 1996). In the end of 1990s these 
figures were Roman Catholic 39.2%, Protestant 4.6%, Orthodox 3%, Atheists 39.8%, other 13.4% 
(The World Factbook 1999 cited in O’Mahony 2000:1). 
196 Czech research institute STEM found in December 1999 that: 12% of Czechs attend church 
services at least once a month, 37% believe in God, 44% attend Christmas mass (Huk 2000). 
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other countries, the Czech Catholicism is far from being homogeneous and is made 
up of a variety of people who have a wide range of opinions on social issues197.  
About one fourth of the population favors the Church participation in politics198, in 
the beginning of 1990s the population was sharply divided because of the main 
religious political issue - restitution of the confiscated property to the Churches –, but 
later the majority of the population tended to support the restitution of buildings and 
to oppose the restitution of forests, fields, and industries to the churches199. As there 
are ten times more Catholics than Protestants, the attitude regarding restitution of 
property to Churches reflects the attitude regarding the Catholic Church200. There 
definitely exists strong anti-clericalism in Czech society. In 1999 only 12.6% of the 
respondents of European Values Study Surveys found that religious leaders should 
influence government decisions, only 8.9% found that it would be better for their 
country if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office, and only 
10.3% found that religious leaders should influence how people vote in elections201. 
The population is in favor of pro-choice attitude regarding abortion, even the 
electorate of the Christian Democratic party KDU-CSL (which stood for ‘Abortion is 
prohibited’) were on less anti-abortion position than their party202.  
 
197 There are tensions between "humble believers" and "intellectuals" especially regarding liberal 
values of Western society (Příhoda 1997). 
198 On the basis of survey data collected in 1997 26.1% considered it appropriate for the Church to 
declare itself on governmental policy (Flere 2001:187-190). 
199 Clark 1996. Opinion polls (by the Institute of Public Opinion Research) carried out from 1991 
show an average of 50% or less opposed to church restitution with this figure falling to 36% by 1996. 
Another poll in 1996, showed that a majority of respondents were in favor of restitution. (O’Mahony 
2000:8) 
200 The Catholic Church still is the most powerful religious institution of the country. In 1999 84.3% of 
the religiously affiliated people belonged to the Catholic Church (Halman 2001:74). 
201 Ibid. pp. 105-107 
202 Kitschelt et al 1999:318-319 
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4.1.2. Symbolical religion 
The Czech Republic203 consists of the territories of three historic Czech provinces: 
Bohemia, Moravia and southern parts of Silesia. There has never existed a 
Czechoslovak nation204. The ancestors of Czech people accepted Christianity in the 
9th century205. Czech’s national feeling is closely connected with the Hussites and the 
Battle of White Mountain (8 November 1620), where by that time the 
overwhelmingly Protestant Czechs were defeated by Catholic Austria206. The 
“Hussite” Church has been the historical national Church for the Czechs. Forced 
conversion to Catholicism in following Counter-Reformation was later perceived as 
anti-national207, so the Czechs took the Hussite Protestantism as a basis of national 
ideology in nineteenth century208.  
The Catholic Church became increasingly subordinated to the state209, Catholicism 
remained the state religion also from 1867 to 1918210. From 1867 all the churches 
 
203 The Czech Republic has only existed since 1993, but the Czech’s lands have been a separate 
geopolitical entity since the ninth century. Czechoslovakia, a composite state of the Czechs and the 
Slovaks, was created out of the Austro-Hungarian Empire after World War I and existed from 1918-
93. (Clark 1996) 
204 The Church in Czechoslovakia was never national, as Czechs and Slovaks had their own 
autonomous national histories and identities (Ramet 1998:113). 
205 Tretera 1999:1 
206 Ramet 1987:73-74,79; Ramet 1998:113. Before the Battle of White Mountain, approximately 85 to 
90% of the population of the Czech lands were not Catholic, but under the new policy of cuius regio, 
eius religio (whose land, those religion), the country was quickly and effectively reconverted to 
Catholicism (Clark 1996).  
207 Under the Habsburgs, forced Catholicization proceeded hand in hand with Germanization and thus 
there has always been in the Czech lands a feeling that Catholicism, although the majority religion, is 
at the same time anti-national (O’Mahony 2000:9). 
208 Protestantism became a crime punishable by death. Counter-Reformation decreased the number of 
the population of Bohemia and Moravia from 3 million to less than one million. The Catholic faith 
was the official religion of the state. In 1874 the government was authorized to regulate internal 
Church affairs, i.e. the Catholic Church became legally subordinate to the state. (Ramet 1998:114) 
209 Since the Counter-Reformation, the Roman Catholic Church gradually came under the control of 
the state through most of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Clark 1996). 
210 The principle cuius regio, eius religio allowed Catholicism to be the only legal religion in the 
Habsburg empire until 1849 (Winter 2000). From 1867 Catholicism remained the state religion in the 
Austrian half of the empire (Ramet 1998:106-107). 
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gained a right to be registered by the state if they fulfill legal demands211, but the 
population remained overwhelmingly Catholic up to the World War I212. While all 
the recognized churches were financially dependent on the state and had to gain the 
state’s approval for church appointments, the Catholic Church remained clearly 
favored. 
After the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire in 1918, the new Czechoslovak State 
incorporated the 1874 Habsburg law on state control of religion into its legal 
codex213. As a result of an upsurge of anti-Catholic and anticlerical feeling among the 
Czechs the Hussite church was revived and many Czech intellectuals converted to 
Protestantism214. The Czech anti-Catholicism lost much of its stream by the 1930s215, 
although Czechoslovak President Tomas Masaryk tried to follow the Western model 
of separation of church and state and the Czechoslovak government supported 
Hussite churches216. Like in the politics of 1990s, also for the Masaryk government 
the main concern was economy217, not religion or cultural issues.  
The Communist regime used for the persecution of the church the anti-Catholic 
sentiment prevalent in the population and the tradition of the subordination of the 
Churches to the state218. The government particularly targeted the Catholic Church 
 
211 Registered churches had the right to teach religion at public schools and to practice religious 
services in the army. Salaries of priests were partially financed by state (Tretera 1999:1). 
212 Catholics formed 96.1% of the population of the Czech lands in 1890 (Clark 1996). 
213 Winter 2000 
214 Ramet 1998:114. After 1920 ca 20% of the Czech people voluntarily gave up their membership in 
the Catholic Church, half of these founded the Czechoslovakian Church in 1920 (Tretera 1999:1). 
215 Official land reforms of 1919 took lands from the Catholic Church, reducing their holdings to two 
percent of the current Czech Republic. Over time, the support for strict separation of church and state 
diminished, in 1925 the government officially supported the celebration of the 510th anniversary of 
Jan Hus's martyrdom and in 1929 it honored the millennium of St. Wenceslas. In addition, state 
financial support of registered churches was increased in 1926. (Clark 1996) 
216 Ramet 1998:115.  
217 Within a short time after World War I, the young Czech nation developed into the seventh largest 
industrialized state of its day (Stránský 2000). 
218 In Czechoslovakia the communist state continued to pay salaries to clergy (Ramet 1998:6). Under 
the 1948 constitution, all church lands, schools were nationalized and clergy became state officials. 
The State Office for Church Affairs supervised and controlled the churches. From 1949 direct state 
financial support was given to all registered churches. (Clark 1996) 
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and those who did not submit to the changed conditions219. The situation improved 
only for a brief period during the Prague Spring of 1968, but later again the 
repressive laws were enforced220. There were also several clergy who remained part 
of the underground church and of the opposition to the end. The 1980s saw a clear 
sharpening of the regime’s effort to undermine religion221. The principal hardship for 
the Catholic Church was the Czechoslovakia’s unwillingness to accept the Vatican’s 
candidates for vacant Episcopal seats222. There were a number of Catholic dissidents 
who during Communist regime played an active role in the opposition and brought 
with it also the rising public support for the Catholic Church both among believers 
and non-believers223. 
The Roman Catholic Church entered the transition period as the oldest, the largest 
and most influential religious institution in the Czech Republic. In November 1989 
bloodless "Velvet Revolution" there were some Church activists involved. Although 
the organized churches and the underground church were not nearly as involved in 
the revolution as they were in Poland224, the public supported the Church. The 
Catholic Church seemed to benefit a lot from the transition225. Having undergone 
severe persecution under Communist regime, the image of the Catholic Church had 
lost at least some of its anti-national image226.  
 
219 In 1950 police arrested 3000 monks and 10,000 nuns (Ramet 1998:117). Over 2,000 priests were 
placed in labor camps, and the majority of monastic orders were closed (Clark 1996; O’Mahony 
2000:2). 
220 O’Mahony 2000:1 
221 Throughout the 1970s and 1980s Catholic clergy and lay activists had been subjected to 
harassment, intimidation, arrests, the confiscation of religious materials, and even murder. In early 
1980s still about a hundred priests were in prisons. (Ramet 1998:133,134). 
222 In November 1988 ten of the country’s thirteen Episcopal seats remained vacant (ibid. p. 134). 
223 O’Mahony names Frantisek Tomasek, Vaclav Maly and Vaclav Benda (O’Mahony 2000:9). 
224 Clark 1996 
225 The pope visited the country in 1990 and candidates selected by Rome filled all the vacant 
Episcopal seats. Also the restoration of confiscated property to the Church was started, and passage of 
a law in 1990 permitting private and religious schools. (Ramet 1998:139) 
226 The Czech linguistic, cultural, economic, and political revival since the 19th century was never on 
very good terms with Catholicism (and vice-versa). The transition to democracy was one relative 
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During the first visit of pope to the Czech Republic, the socio-political position of the 
Catholic Church seemed to be good: there were several politicians from the political 
elite willing to use the pro-Catholic atmosphere of that period, which unfortunately 
motivated also the liberals within the Civic Forum to launch a counter-offensive227.  
In the beginning of transition population did not share militant anti-Catholic 
sentiment, but the historical tradition of anti-Catholicism, closely linked to the 
national idea, became the main argument used in political debate for not changing the 
system of financial subordination of the churches to the state.  
 
Table 7. The Czech Republic. Indicators of religion in society  
Indicator Nature Value 
Strength of 
institutional 
religion 
Middle level of religious affiliation, level of religious 
attendance relatively low  
Weak (2) 
Strength of 
symbolical 
religion 
National idea closely linked to anti-Catholicism and 
the Hussite church. In the beginning of transition the 
anti-Catholicism sentiment decreased for a brief 
period.  
Middle (3)* 
Clerical/anti-
clerical 
cleavage 
The social conflict tends to be biased towards anti-
clericalism 
Middle (3) 
Religious-
secular 
cleavage 
Relatively few of those, who are religious according 
to Church doctrine, large proportion of convinced 
atheists 
Weak (2) 
* As the symbolical religion is essentially anti-Catholic, the strength of symbolical religion is very 
weak for the Catholic Church 
                                                                                                                                           
exception to that rule that proved not to last long. Old stereotypes came back as the country returned to 
ordinary life. (Příhoda 1997) 
227 Halik 1997 
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4.2. Religion in politics 
4.2.1. Religious political cleavage 
Religion is of secondary importance as an indicator of voting preference and party 
identification228. By far the strongest factor that divides issue opinions is socio-
economic protectionism versus market liberalism, religion-morality dimension is 
much weaker than the economic divide229. Religious vote is most closely linked with 
the Christian Democratic Union – Czechoslovakian People’s Party (KDU-CSL), 
which is the only party that supports Church’s influence over politics and Church 
position on abortion230. Religion-secularism is important source of party 
identification mainly for KDU-CSL and Social Democrats, as both were appealing to 
the voters who identified themselves as centrist231. 
As KDU-CSL has relatively small share of seats in the parliament, religion is only 
relatively relevant in the party politics of the Czech Republic. The situation of the 
Church did not improve substantially during the time when KDU-CSL was part of 
government coalition (1992-1998). Religion (i.e. the restitution issue) was among the 
aspects that caused the break-up of the government in 1997, but as the KDU-CSL 
was only a minor coalition partner, religion can be counted at most as a secondary 
basis of coalition formation. Religious divide in the party politics does not overlap 
with other cleavages. 
 
228 In 1997 public opinion survey only 8.6% of the respondents told that religious conviction has an 
impact on their political attitudes (Flere 2001:187). 
229 Kitschelt et al 1999:266 
230 Czech parties were in the mid 1990s mostly on the position of rejecting the church influence. Only 
KDU-CSL was endorsing the church influence. (Kitschelt et al 1999:318-319) 
231 There was a potential for rivalry for the Social Democrats and the Christian Democratic Union 
(KDU-CSL); 61% of KDU-CSL supporters put themselves at the center and 60% of Social Democrat 
supporters also saw themselves as being centrist. (Mateju et al 1998:264) 
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4.2.2. Goals attained by the Church 
The main religious issue that became politicized in the Czech politics was the 
restitution of Church property confiscated during the Communist regime. This issue 
in turn became closely linked with the issues of regulation of religious market and of 
social conflict. The abortion and religious education issues were solved without a 
major dispute and mostly by rejecting the will of the Church. 
The Catholic Church had to accept the compromise solutions regarding religious 
education and abortion. Catholic Church was unable to obtain also the introduction of 
religious instruction per se into the public school system. Instead, a class on “civic 
education” has been introduced, designed to inform schoolchildren about morals and 
ethics232. Also the goal of the Church regarding abortion – a strict ban on abortion - 
remained unfulfilled and compromise solution was incorporated to Constitution and 
to an abortion law233.  
In 1948 Church land and forest holdings were confiscated234. In 1990-1991 church 
received some of its property back235, but proportionally relatively little. At the same 
time the practice of paying the clergy’s salaries was continued on the argument that 
the Church was not able to survive financially on the basis of believers’ donations 
 
232 Ramet 1998:140 
233 In 1990 Czech bishops advocated a strict ban on abortion that the bishops expected to be 
incorporated into a major constitutional text. The Bill of Fundamental Rights and Liberties does not 
give them satisfaction on this point, although it does provide that "human life deserves protection even 
before birth." On 31 March 1992, a bill limiting abortion was introduced before the Czech National 
Council. (Gagnere 1993) 
234 Winter 2000 
235 In Czech Republic about 250 buildings and land plots were returned to Catholic religious orders 
and congregations, but the Church laid claim to an additional 3,300 buildings and 600,000 acres of 
land (Ramet 1998:140). 
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and its own resources236. In 1992 a draft bill that would have returned property to the 
Catholic Church failed in Parliament237. 
Initially the Catholic Church wanted to receive back all the property that was earlier 
lost238, later the Church considered the increasingly negative political climate as well 
as its position as the greatest claimant of previously confiscated property, and was 
ready for compromise solution239. As the political opposition to the restitution of 
church property grew, the Church hierarchy was willing to accept a compromise 
solution, being content with the return of just 800 of the 3,300 buildings in dispute240. 
When the Social Democratic government came to power in August 1998, it halted 
further restitution of 432,250 acres of land and some 700 buildings to the Catholic 
Church241. Both politicians and bishops stress that the restitution of property to the 
Catholic Church is failed due to the public opposition to it, because of an age-old 
antipathy towards Catholicism242. 
The 1992 constitution requires that the state not exclusively identify with one 
particular religion or ideology, but does not specify how closely the state should or 
should not cooperate with or support churches243. The Communist ‘Czechoslovak 
 
236 Ramet 1998:140 
237 O’Mahony 2000:5 
238 In 1993 the Catholic bishops requested that the government return to the Church not only churches 
and monasteries but also other properties such as farms, forests, even some small breweries which had 
once belonged to the church. (DiDomizio 1997) 
239 Sidonie Winter states that the Roman Catholic Church was deliberating about if and how much of 
its property would be needed to cover its expenses, aside from other financial resources such as gifts, 
collections, and intentions (Winter 2000).  
240 Ramet 1998:140. This in turn would have meant that the church was still in need also of state 
subsidies. 
241 U.S. Department of State (2000) “The Czech Republic” 
242 O’Mahony 2000:7 
243 The economic provisions of 1949 provide for direct state support of all registered churches, were 
still in effect in 1996. In 1995, this support equaled about 400 million crowns ($15.4 million) yearly 
and was divided among fifteen of the registered churches as needed to pay the salaries of their clergy 
(Clark 1996). 
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Federal Law on Churches and Religious Organization’ continues to operate as the 
enabling legislation244. 
In comparison with other countries of the study the legal demands for registration of 
religious organization or church are extremely strict in the Czech Republic245 and 
there have been efforts to raise the legal demands for entry to the religious market 
even higher246. All religions officially registered receive subsidies from the State247. 
In 2000 there were 21 such state-recognized religions. 
The Catholic Church is definitely the largest church in the religious market (more 
than 80% of affiliated religious people are Catholics), but it is the only one claiming 
restitution of property, as other denominations do not or cannot make such claims248. 
Restitution is important for the Catholic Church because it would provide an 
independent source of income249, and would increase the resources of the Catholic 
Church250. The disproportional benefits that the Catholic Church would get from 
restitution have led to increasing hostility regarding the Catholic Church251. 
The image of the Catholic Church has become increasingly spoiled partly because of 
the acts that the Church itself has done. In 1995 tensions between Catholics and non-
 
244 The Law maintains the institutionalized economic arrangement between church and state where 
priests and bishops (regarded under Communism as civil servants) remain on the payroll of the state. 
(O’Mahony 2000:3) 
245 For a church or religious organization to be registered under 1991 law, 10,000 of Czech signatures 
are required or 500 Czech signatures if the church is a member of the World Council of Churches 
(Clark 1996). 
246 In December 2001 President Vaclav Havel vetoed a proposed more restrictive law for registration 
of religious groups. Proposed law required for registration of religious groups 20,000 signatures of 
Czech citizens - double the number of signatures required earlier. (Helsinki Commission Co-Chairman 
Praises Czech President for Veto of Restrictive Religion Law. Washington, December 10, 2001) 
247 Churches receive approximately $88.2 million annually from the Government. Funds are divided 
proportionately among the 21 registered religions according to membership. (U.S. Department of State 
(2000) “The Czech Republic”) 
248 Here are meant the Hussite Church, the Old Catholic Church and the Orthodox churches. Protestant 
Churches in Czech lands did not own any land, they are generally satisfied with state financial support 
and gladly settle for the return of a few previously owned buildings. (Winter 2000) 
249 O’Mahony 2000:6 
250 Winter 2000 
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Catholics, and also between the Catholic Church and the government increased when 
Pope John Paul II canonized Jan Sankander252. Non-Catholics are afraid that the 
Catholic Church wants to assert its hegemony253 and the state subsidies to this church 
are perceived as too large254. 
Table 8. The Czech Republic. Variables and indicators of religion in politics 
Variable Nature and value of the indicators Value 
Religion is not a main basis of coalition formation (3) 
Religion is of secondary importance as an indicator of 
voting preference and party identification (3) 
Religious 
political 
cleavage 
Religious political cleavage is weak and does not overlap 
with other cleavages (1) 
Middle 
(3) 
Restitution of property started in 1990, but came to 
standstill (1) 
No explicitly religious education classes in public schools 
(1) 
The Church could not influence much the content of the 
moderate abortion law (1992) (2) 
There are strict laws for registration of religious groups. 
The Church’ effort to make them stricter has failed. 21 
religions receive state subsidies (2) 
Goals 
attained by 
the Church  
Church and state are separated, but the Catholic Church 
has not achieved autonomy from state (1) 
Weak- 
very 
weak 
(1.5) 
Access to 
government 
Church has not gained an access to the government (1) 
Values for the indicators of the goals attained by the Church: 5 points are given if the issue was solved 
favorably for the Church, 4 points are given if the issue was solved basically favorably for the Church 
but with restrictions, 3 points are given for the compromise solution, 2 points are given for the issue 
that was solved unfavorably for the Church, but the Church had some influence over decisions and its 
interests were not ignored totally, 1 point is given for an issue that was solved unfavorably for the 
Church. 
                                                                                                                                           
251 Ramet 1998:140 
252 In the eyes of many Czechs Sankander, a Pole, was branded a traitor to the Czech cause, because he 
reportedly betrayed military secrets to the invading Catholic army. (DiDomizio 1997; David W. 
Hendon and James M. Kennedy (1995). Notes on church-state affairs: Czech Republic. Journal of 
Church & State 4:927) 
253 Ramet 1998:140 
254 Catholic clergy said in 1996 that it would cost $1.5 billion just to restore churches, monasteries, and 
other buildings. The expected burden to state has caused the increasing public resentment. (Jordan, 
Michael J. “Now-secular Hungarians reluctant to return schools to church”, Christian Science 
Monitor, September 09, 1996, 199:7) 
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4.2.3. Access of the Church to the government 
The inability of the Church to gain access to the government was the main reason for 
the change in strategy in the third parliamentary elections. The interests of the Church 
have been represented at the level of one party, but not at the level of the government. 
The total level of the access to the government is counted as very weak. 
4.3. Church’s strategies 
Radical demands, Christian strategy, support to one party 
The Catholic Church entered democracy with radical demands and active 
participation in the political process. In 1990 election, when the image of the Catholic 
Church was quite good, Czech bishops pointed out that in elections citizens should be 
guided by Christian principles255. But the initial public support for the Church did not 
last256. Church chose to be identified with one party, KDU-CSL, and that party 
represented the goals of the Church in the political arena257. That strategy anyway did 
not guarantee for the Church an access to the policy-making process, as the 
government coalition in whole did not accept the demands of the Church258. Church 
had no direct link to government, even in 1998 there did not exist any structural body 
 
255 Gagnere 1993 
256 Hanuš 2000 
257 For example, KDU-CSL was militantly against the law that gave homosexual couples similar rights 
to those of a husband and wife (“Catholic church protests registered partnership for homosexuals”, AP 
Worldstream, February 03, February 03, 2001), and stood in the political arena for the position of the 
Church that sex education must be based on ‘Christian principles’ (Ramet 1998:141).  
258 The issue of restitution was processed entirely at the level of the state with the church having little 
impact on eventual outcomes (O’Mahony 2000:6). 
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where the politicians and the Church hierarchy could meet and discuss over the 
restitution-issue259.  
Table 9. Election to the National Council (1992) and House of Representatives 
(1996, 1998) 
 1992 1996 1998 
Party Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats
(CSSD) Czech Social Democratic Party 6,5% 16 26,4% 61 32,3% 74 
(ODS) Civic Democratic Party, conserv. 29,7% 76 29,6% 68 27,7% 63 
(KSCM) Communist Party of Bohemia and 
Moravia, communist 14,0% 35 10,3% 22 11,0% 24 
(KDU-CSL) Christian Democratic Union-
Czech People's Party, christian-dem. 6,3% 15 8,1% 18 9,0% 20 
(US) Freedom Union, conserv.-liberal - - - - 8,6% 19 
(RSC-SPR) Republican Party of 
Czechoslovakia, nationalist 6,0% 14 8,0% 18 3,9% - 
(ODA) Civic Democratic Alliance, conserv. 5,9% 14 6,4% 13 - - 
(LSU) Liberal Social Union, liberal 6,5% 16 - - - - 
(HSD-SMS) Society for Moravia and Silesia, 
regionalist 5,9% 14 - - - - 
Others 19,2% - 6,4% - 7,5% - 
Pro-Church parties are in bold shrift. 
Source: Europe - parliamentary elections since 1945, accessed March 6, 2002, 
http://www-public.rz.uni-duesseldorf.de/~nordsiew/czech.html
The predecessor of KDU-CSL, the Czechoslovak People’s Party (CSL) was between 
1948 and 1989 CSL under control of Communist Party. After the “Velvet 
Revolution” CSL has regained the status of an independent Christian political party. 
In 1992 the CSL fused together with the new party Christian and Democratic Union 
and the Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People’s Party (KDU-CSL) 
arose. The KDU-CSL was a part of the right-wing coalition that governed till the 
1998 parliamentary election.260
                                                 
259 Church was from the beginning concerned that it had not been allowed to participate officially in a 
democratic decision making process. (O’Mahony 2000:7) 
260 Basic Information about KDU-CSL. KDU-CSL homepage, accessed March 6, 2002,  
http://www.kdu.cz/ENGLISH/def_inf.htm
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KDU-CSL has been the most active party on issues of Catholic communal 
property261 and has most eagerly sought clarity on the churches role in society262. 
Originally, after 1989, there was also another ally of the Catholic Church - the 
Christian Democratic Party of Vaclav Benda, but this was a weak party with few 
roots in society and it merged soon with the ODS263. Although even certain leaders of 
the Civic Democrats have claimed that their party embodies many of the values 
attributed to Christian Democracy264, the only Christian party (that represents 
religious electorate265 and organized religion) remains KDU-CSL. In the first two 
elections, KDU-CSL should be counted as a Christian party, which radically stood 
for the religious values and the positions of the Church.  
Too close identification of KDU-CSL with the Catholic Church motivated other 
parties to label it as ‘Vatican messenger-boy’. The other parties tried to forge their 
own identities by concentrating on negative identification with KDU-CSL - ‘we are 
not what you are’266.  
As in the Czech Republic, almost all public issues and ideological orientations can be 
translated into left-right semantics, the KDU-CSL became soon disappointed in being 
too closely identified with the church and religious issues267.  
The social mood gradually changed and anti-clerical emotions started to re-emerge, 
and there were also those who started cultivating and using that mood268. The 
culmination came in 1997, when the restitution issue was one of the factors behind 
 
261 U.S. Department of State (2000), “The Czech Republic” 
262 O’Mahony 2000:3 
263 O’Mahony 2000:16 
264 Gagnere 1993 
265 In the beginning of 1990s KDU-CSL attracted 30 to 40 per cent of devout Czechs (Tóka 1996:111). 
266 O’Mahony 2000:16,18 
267 Zarycki 2000:867; Evans and Whitefield 1998:121,126; Markowski 1997:238;240 
268 Halik 1997 
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the collapse of the government coalition269. For the Church, the situation did not 
improve when the Social Democrats formed government in 1998270. The bishops held 
anti-Catholicism as the cause for the Church’s lack of success in creating links with 
the state271. Anti-Catholicism was in turn fuelled by the Church’s choice to 
emphasize the restitution issue too intensively, which created the impression that the 
church is an institution interested only in property272. In 2001 the restitution question 
was unsolved, the Church was still dependent on state and lacking the access to the 
state273. The state has tried to isolate the church from public activity even more274. 
But the positions of parties regarding the restitution issue were not stable. 
Throughout the period 1992-1998 the only two parties that remained consistent on 
the restitution-issue were relatively minor parties - the Communists and KDU-
CSL275. There are many examples about the changes in the positions of parties 
regarding restitution issue276.  
 
269 O’Mahony 2000:9. (Of the culminating tensions a year before wrote also David W. Hendon and 
James M. Kennedy (1996) “Notes on church-state affairs: Czech Republic”, Journal of Church & 
State, 4:934) 
270 O’Mahony 2000:7 
271 Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus made several statements in 1993-1994 criticizing the public role of 
the Catholic Church, but for the most part his remarks were directed not towards Catholicism per se 
but towards the potential role of the Catholic Church in Czech society. (O’Mahony 2000:13-14) 
272 Hanuš 2000 
273 O’Mahony 2000:2 
274 President Vaclav Havel vetoed in the beginning of 2002 legislation that would prevent churches 
from operating hospitals and charities, would give government officials the right to approve the 
opening of places of worship and formation of religious communities, would raise the membership 
threshold for churches seeking legal status and would require all profits from church-owned 
enterprises to be used solely for religious purposes. (“Czech Church Praises Veto of Legislation 
Limiting Churches”. America, January 07, 2002) 
275 O’Mahony 2000:10 
276 Prior to 1992 the smaller of the two Christian Democrats, Vaclav Benda’s right-wing Christian 
Democrats began with an extreme position on restitutions, modified this substantially when they 
formed an electoral pact with ODS. Throughout the coalitions KDU-CSL held back from criticizing 
the ODS’ anti-church restitution line. The ODA began with an anti-church restitution line, later shifted 
their position to pro-restitution. The ODS was initially pro-restitution, but ultimately backed the Social 
Democrats policy to stop all church restitutions. Even Social Democrats modified for a while their 
opposing-position on the eve of their coming to power in 1998. (O’Mahony 2000:10) 
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More moderate demands, neutrality regarding political competition 
The Church hierarchy has admitted that the strategic choice to be identified with 
KDU-CSL proved to be counter-productive. The Press Secretary of the Catholic 
Church stated in 1998 that the link with KDU-CSL is ‘very-very bad’ for the Church 
and that it would be much better to discuss with the Government, not through only 
one party277. Church would prefer direct links with the state, but has not been able to 
achieve these. During the years the Catholic Church have admitted its weak position 
in terms of symbolical religion and became more willing to accept compromise 
solutions (regarding abortion, religious education, even restitution issue).  
KDU-CSL, in turn, decided to distance a bit from the Church and became of member 
of the four-party coalition in 1999. The four-party coalition is also determined to 
support the churches and Christian values, but this is done according to Christian 
Democratic tradition. In the document “The Christian Democratic Policy For the 21st 
Century” (1998) KDU-CSL states that they are not ‘political hand of the churches’.278  
4.4. Discussion 
Why has the Czech Church not gained access to government? Why is the level of 
attained goals so low? Would it been different, if the Church would have chosen 
another strategy and chosen not so radical demands? The Church itself has admitted 
that the choice of radical demands and Christian strategy (with a support to one party) 
proved to be counter-productive. The Church changed both its strategy to Christian 
 
277 O’Mahony 2000:17 
278 Four Czech center-right independent parties: KDU-CSL, US, ODA, and DEU – formed a four-
party coalition in 1999.  and a year later signed a Declaration “United for Change”, which states that 
these four parties represent “standard European political currents: a conservative and Christian-
Democratic current, based above all on European Christian traditions, and a liberal current, which 
emphasizes the importance of the political and economic freedom of the individual.” (KDU-CSL 
homepage, accessed March 6, 2002, http://www.kdu.cz/ENGLISH/def_inf.htm) 
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Democratic (whereas the Church claims that the preferred solution for the Church 
would be neutrality regarding the competition of parties, i.e. a direct access to the 
government) and its radical demands to more moderate ones. If the strategy of 
neutrality or the choice of more moderate demands were taken by the Church from 
the beginning, the chances to get access to government and Church’s goals fulfilled 
would have been better. The radical demands of the Church motivated parties to use 
the symbolical religion (anti-Catholicism) against the Church and its political ally. If 
more moderate claims were chosen, the motivation of the parties to use anti-
clericalism would have been smaller.  
The institutionalization of religious social cleavage to religious political cleavage was 
dependent on the strategic choices made by the Church. And in Czech case these 
choices advanced the institutionalization of religious political cleavage, but not the 
interests of the Church.  
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Chapter 5. Estonia 
5.1. Religion in society 
5.1.1. Institutional religion 
As a legacy from communist rule, the levels of religious affiliation and attendance are 
very low in Estonia. Only approximately 17% of the population has established a 
formal membership with religious communities and the largest denomination, 
Lutherans, is approximately 11% of population, the second largest denomination is 
the Orthodox Church279. This shows a tremendous decrease since interwar state, 
where only less than 1% of population was not a member of some denomination.  
Ethnic Russians tend to be more religious than ethnic Estonians280. The level of 
religious practice is also one of the lowest in the world - according to the World 
Values surveys from 1995-1997 only 4% of Estonians were attending church at least 
once a week. The levels of religiosity tend to remain the same among ethnical 
Estonians, while these are rising among other ethnic groups281. According to the 
surveys of 1995 and 2000, the proportion of those who deemed religion to be 
especially important decreased from 8% to 7% among Estonians and increased from 
 
279 Ringvee 2001; Liiman 2001 
280 Smith-Sivertsen 2000:238 
281 According to the public opinion surveys made by Estonian Council of Churches, Estonian Bible 
Society and Estonian Evangelical Alliance (ECC-EBS-EEA survey) 19% of population belonged to 
the congregations in 1995, in 2000 the number was 24%. There was no increase among ethnical 
Estonians (it remained 24%), among other ethnic groups the affiliation level rose from 13% to 25%. 
(The homepage of ECC, accessed April 22, 2002, 
http://www.ekn.ee/TOOVALDKONNAD/SOTS/index.htm.) 
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11% to 14% among non-Estonians. The proportion of Estonians that identified 
themselves as believers increased from 9% to 11%, among non-Estonians the 
numbers were 25% and 35%282. The overall percentage of those who identified 
themselves as believers rose from 16% to 20%283.  
The public opinion is mostly indifferent regarding religious social issues284. The 
differences of attitudes between church-members and non-church-members do not 
differ markedly, as can be seen from the Table 10.  
Table 10. Estonia. Comparison of the moral attitudes of Church-members and 
non-Church-members (percentage of those being in favor of...) 
 Death 
penalty 
Euthanasia Abort Extramarital sex Prostitution 
Church-
member 
53% 28% 13% 21% 2% 
Non-church 
member 
58% 45% 23% 37% 7% 
Source: ECC-EBS-EEA survey of 2000 
The religious-secular cleavage is weak in society, the Church-members tend to have 
more conservative positions, but liberally minded religiously non-affiliated people 
outnumber them. Besides that, there is no strong polarization in society over values.  
As the Church has remained neutral regarding the political competition, and it has not 
chosen to support any party or coalition of parties, there has not arisen clerical/anti-
clerical cleavage in society.  
                                                 
282 Remmel 2001:42,43 
283 Ibid. 
284 For example in the 2000 ECC-EBS-EEA survey, the answer ‘I don’t know, it depends on the 
situation’ was given by 53.6% of respondents to question whether abortion was right, and by 49.3% of 
respondents to the questions whether homosexuality or extramarital sex was right. Only 7,9% of 
respondents were against death penalty, 22,7% against abortion, and 17,5% against extramarital sex. 
Also according to the survey made by the department of political science of University of Tartu in 
2000, 55% of the respondents trusted the Church, but 33% did not know how to answer (Toomla 
2001:30). Main reason could have been that they did not know a lot about the Church or the Church is 
not enough seen in the society.  
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5.1.2. Symbolical religion 
Estonia was converted to Catholicism in the beginning of 13th century, but 
Reformation succeeded in the 1520s and in 1686 the Lutheran Church became a state 
church according to the Church law of Sweden. Some decades later Russia annexed 
Estonia, but the privileges of Baltic-German nobility to supervise the church 
remained.  
In 1832 the status of the Lutheran Church was reduced to a tolerated religion next to 
Orthodox state church285. Denominationally homogeneous country became multi-
confessional from the middle of 19th century, when there was a movement from 
Lutheran Church to Orthodox Church among Estonians286. Population perceived the 
Lutheran Church as a German church, and Orthodox Church as a Russian church287. 
The Lutheran Church as an institution fought against Estonian national awakening, 
although several pastors supported it. In the first half of 19th century the Lutheran 
Church fought against the Church of Brethren that was closely linked to Estonian 
national awakening288.  
Estonian intelligentsia was divided regarding the proximity of Estonian national idea 
to Lutheran Church. There were those who hold the Church as the first enemy of the 
national awakening, and were against the idea that Estonians should become clergy in 
the Lutheran Church289. There were also some clergy of Estonian descent that tended 
to link Estonian national identity with the Lutheran church290, but even they were not 
pleased with the ius patronatus functioning in the Church (which allowed the 
 
285 Liiman 2001:13 
286 Ibid. By 1897 there was 13% of Estonian people Orthodox (ibid. p. 14). 
287 Liiman 2001:14 
288 Veem 1990:99 
289 Saard 2000:48,106. The conflict between prominent leaders – Carl Robert Jakobson and Jakob Hurt 
– eventually divided the whole national movement. Jakobson accursed the Lutheran minister Jakob 
Hurt (Estonian by descent) that he has changed the benefit of his country against the benefit coming 
from the social positions of the clergy (Jakobson, 1959:164). 
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landowners to invite and name the pastor for a congregation291) and were sometimes 
repressed by the Lutheran Church292.  
The conversion from Lutheranism to Orthodoxy was supported by the Czarist 
government policy, the conversion back to Lutheranism became allowed only after 
the law of religious toleration in 1905293. Estonian intelligentsia remained religiously 
indifferent or even anti-clerical up to the 20  centuryth 294. The Estonian national 
movement tried to reconcile the division over Lutheranism, but the role of the 
religion was eventually limited mostly to the field of morals295. The nationalist 
movement wanted to decrease the power of the Church296. Only after 1905 Estonians 
started actively to demand Estonian clergy as parish vicars297. Until 1918 the German 
Landeskirchen were governed by the ius patronatus and belonged to the descendants 
of the Teutonic knights, the Estonian clerical participation in these German-
controlled Lutheran churches remained minor298.  
The independent Estonian state nationalized all the lands and buildings of the Church 
in 1919, in 1925 these were partly restituted299. In the interwar years there was no 
state church300, but both the Estonian Lutheran Church and Estonian Orthodox 
 
290 The main argument for defending German culture was the idea that Estonian culture was a partaker 
in it (Hurt 1989:82). 
291 Veem 1990:162 
292 In 1879 the nationalist-minded Estonian pastor Jakob Hurt accused the Baltic-German Church in 
being against the Estonian national movement. As a result was ‘exiled’ to St Petersburg (Hurt 1989:9).  
293 Karjahärm 1997:17, 18, 29 
294 Karjahärm et al 2001:106
295 Veem 1990:166 
296 There were different opinions of the proximity of the Lutheran Church to Estonian national 
identity, but it was widely accepted that the public school should not be under the influence of the 
Church (Tarvel 1960:138,120). 
297 Saard 2000:312 
298 Hope 2001:1274 
299 Post, Evar. “Riigi ja Kiriku vahekord Eesti Vabariigis”, Eesti Kirik, May 13, 1990; Karjahärm et al 
2001:108
300 The 1920 Constitution set forth that there should be no state religion (Kiviorg 1999:2). 
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Church wanted to get closer to the national idea301. Lutheran Church strived to get rid 
of the image of Herrenkirche302 and to become a people’s church, but in fact it did 
not manage to do so, because there remained too great number of clergy of German 
descent until the year 1939303. As a matter of fact, in the beginning of the 20th century 
there was proportionally more ethnical Estonian clergy in Orthodox Church than in 
Lutheran church304.  
In 1934, Konstantin Päts, the head of state, established a mild authoritarian regime305 
that passed laws strengthening the links between state and church and as the rights of 
the state increased, the quite democratic principles of the people’s church were 
abandoned306, and the Lutheran and Orthodox churches became public-legal 
persons307.  
Another sign of the fact that the Lutheran Church did not manage to become national 
church of Estonians during the interwar years was the quite low level of religiosity of 
Estonians308.  
With the Soviet occupation and the implementation of anti-Christian legislation, the 
Church lost most of its clergy and its property was nationalized. The people did not 
 
301 In 1923 the Estonian Orthodox church went to judicial subordination to Patriachy of Constantinople 
(Liiman 2001:15). Apostolic Orthodox Church introduced services, songs, liturgy in Estonian 
language, in order to get closer to the national sentiment (Karjahärm et al 2001:116-117). 
302 Goeckel 1995:202 
303 In Lutheran church there were 44% of Estonian pastors in 1919, 77% in 1939, 54% of Germans in 
1919, 22% in 1939, 3% of Swedes in 1919, 1% in 1939. During interwar years the German clergy, 
although numerous, was not allowed to take part in church leadership. In 1939 65 pastors left Estonia, 
all German pastors, but also some Estonian pastors. (Karjahärm et al 2001:108,111) 
304 In 1909 there were 61% (75 out of 123) Estonian priests in Estonian Orthodox church, by 1936 
Estonian Orthodox Church had 212,700 members. (Karjahärm et al 2001:111,115) 
305 Svege et al 2000:51 
306 Karjahärm et al 2001:113,114 
307 Liiman 2001:16. Finally, Constitution of 1937 stipulated that there is no state church but added that 
the state can grant status in public law to big churches (Kiviorg 1999:2). 
308 Goeckel 1995:219. In 1934 77,6% considered himself or herself to be Lutherans, 74,3% were 
members of the EELC, but only 17,8% of population paid annual membership tax to the Lutheran 
Church (Liiman 2001:18). 
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identify themselves as church-members and due to atheist socialization, the number 
of church-members decreased rapidly309.  
Estonian Lutheran Church proved unable to maintain an independent profile during 
the Soviet era310, because the identification of the Lutheran Church with nationalist 
sentiments was undeveloped and there has been no strong symbolic merger of church 
and nation311. Between 1958-1964, during the years of hardest repression of the 
religious denominations in Soviet Union, the number of Lutheran Churches did not 
decrease312, because they had been already dramatically weakened as institutions 
because of accommodation toward the regime313. As a result, the Lutheran Church of 
Estonia played a minor role in the limited political opposition that arose in the early 
1980s. The Lutheran leadership in Estonia lent no support to dissent movements314. 
During transition crises individual pastors participated in opposition movement315, 
Popular Front and Estonian Congress316, while the Church remained neutral. The 
Estonian Lutheran Church was a beneficiary of the changes and not a driving force 
behind them317.  
 
309 Liiman 2001:38. Soviet time saw a harsh Stalinization, including arrest, deportation, and 
intimidation of numerous church leaders and clergy. The churches that were not closed were 
nationalized. The churches’ social presence was eliminated totally, including charitable institutions, 
religious instruction in the schools, and auxiliary organizations. (Goeckel 1995:203) 
310 Nørgaard 1999:53 
311 Johnston 1992:140 
312 In that period the number of Lutheran Churches in Soviet Union even increased from 451 churches 
to 452. The number of Orthodox Churches in Estonia decreased 10 per cent. (Anderson 1994:56) 
313 After initial opposition, the Lutheran churches pursued a policy of accommodation toward the 
regime, calling for an end to armed resistance in the 1940s, supporting Stalin’s peace campaign in the 
1950s, issuing declarations supportive of Soviet foreign policy thereafter. (Goeckel 1995:204) 
314 Goeckel 1995:204,205 
315 Some Estonian pastors were deeply involved in resistance to the Russification of Estonia. In 
summer 1981 the KGB locked up pastor Vello Salum who had publicly declared that it was the duty of 
the Lutheran Church in Estonia to function as an opposition political party and to defend language, 
territory and welfare of Estonians (Ramet 1987:147). 
316 The church was officially declared neutrality, most pastors preferred to support the more 
independence-minded Estonian Congress. (Goeckel 1995:208) 
317 Ibid. p. 213 
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The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Estonia, that century ago was considered to be a 
German church, had not managed to become a national Church318 by the beginning of 
transition. Like in other countries of this study, the levels of religiosity rose among 
the Estonian population319, but the Church was institutionally quite unprepared for 
the transition – it had to define its place in society, its position regarding democracy, 
religious freedom, new religious movements, and moral issues. Also there practically 
did not exist parallel organizations of the Church in the beginning of transition. 
Although the levels of religious practice quite soon decreased again, the religion has 
become a part (although weak) of national identity for both Estonians and Russians 
living in Estonia320. 
The Lutheran Church was only relatively weak in terms of symbolical religion, but 
was far weaker as a manifest church. The Lutheran Church had considerable 
symbolical influence - Lutheran Church as an oldest institution provided the symbols 
and beliefs for the solidarity of Estonian culture, it united Estonia culturally with 
Western civilization, and has been providing also a resource around which Estonians 
can rally for nationalist causes321.  
Though the levels of religious affiliation and attendance are among the lowest in the 
world, 40% of Estonians feel to have Lutheran identity322, the Church is one of the 
 
318 Hoppenbrouwers 1999:162 
319 For example, the number of baptisms arose from 885 in 1970 to 18,608 in 1990 in EELC (Goeckel 
1995:211). 
320 The number of Estonians who call themselves Lutheran is many times higher than the active 
membership of the Lutheran Church (Hoppenbrouwers 1999:163). The same goes for ethnical 
Russians in Estonia. According to survey of 1998, the Orthodox faith (and faith in more broad sense 
had become an inseparable part of the identity of more than half of the Russians living in Estonia. As a 
conclusion Raigo Liiman states that faith strengthens the ethnicity of Estonian Russians. (Liiman 
2001:108) 
321 Andrew Hart made the distinction between “manifest church” and the “latent church”. Manifest 
church includes the buildings, the services, a number of membership, doctrinal attitude not to interfere 
into the political arena. (Hart 1993:10-12) 
322 Smith-Sivertsen 2000:238 
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most trusted institutions in Estonia323, which maintains the fact that symbolical 
religion is not so weak as is the institutional religion. 
Table 11. Estonia. Indicators of religion in society 
Indicator Nature Value 
Strength of 
institutional 
religion 
Low level of religious affiliation, level of religious 
attendance extremely low 
Very 
weak (1)
Strength of 
symbolical 
religion 
Although the national idea is basically civic-secular, 
Lutheranism in Estonia is stronger in symbolical than 
in institutional terms 
Weak 
(2) 
Clerical/anti-
clerical 
cleavage 
The Church as an institution is weak, and there has not 
arisen social conflict. The Church has largely stayed 
out of political competition 
Very 
weak (1)
Religious-
secular 
cleavage 
Population is overwhelmingly liberal or indifferent 
regarding religious values 
Weak 
(2) 
5.2. Religion in politics 
5.2.1. Religious political cleavage 
There is no religious cleavage in Estonian party politics, even if there is a small 
religious divide, it does not overlap with other cleavages. A research based on the 
cleavage formation according to the parliamentary elections of Estonia in 1999 found 
six cleavages and there is no religious cleavage among them324. Religion is little used 
in electoral competition, only some parties make a formal appeal to historical 
religious-national identity or influence of religion to morality in broad sense. There 
are parties representing Russian ethnical minority and Russian minority is more 
religious than Estonians, but they have not brought religious issues to political arena. 
The major Church – EELC – has not made distinction between political worldviews 
                                                 
323 According to ECC-EBS-EEA survey of 2000, church was trusted by 54% of respondents. 
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or parties, and the parties do not have substantially different attitudes regarding the 
Church325. 
The weekly paper of Estonian Evangelical Lutheran Church has presented articles 
about several chosen candidates before the parliamentary elections. This has in some 
extent influenced the vote of the people loyal to the Church, but as the several 
individual pro-Church candidates represent different political parties and the Church 
has not been willing to identify itself with a certain party, religion cannot be counted 
as an important indicator of voting preference. 
5.2.2. Goals attained by the Church 
The Lutheran Church has not fully followed the Lutheran doctrine that the Church 
should not interfere into the political competition, at the same time the positions of 
the Church are far from the extremes that could be seen in the case of Poland and the 
Czech Republic. The positions of the EELC are especially moderate regarding social 
values. For a long time the Estonian Lutheran Church did not even have a committee 
dealing with social-political questions326.  
The only religious conflict involves the split of the Estonian Orthodox Church327. As 
many Estonians profess Orthodoxy, including some leaders of the independence 
 
324 Grofman et al 2000:348. The main dividing lines are ethnic division, urban-rural divide, and socio-
economic divide (Aarebrot et al 2000:309; Svege et al 2000:60) 
325 Survey made by the department of political science of University of Tartu in 2000, Church was 
trusted most by the Moderates (61%), then Fatherland Union (57%) and other parties. According to ‘I 
trust absolutely’, the left-wingers trusted the church more (31%) than right-wingers (14%). (Toomla 
2001:33) 
326 Goeckel 1995:214 
327 The Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church (EAOC), independent since 1919, subordinate to 
Constantinople since 1923, and exiled under the Soviet occupation, was reregistered under its statute 
of 1935 in August 1993. Since then, a group of ethnic Russian and Estonian parishes which preferred 
to remain under the authority of the Russian Orthodox Church structure imposed during the Soviet 
occupation has insisted that it should claim the EAOC name but the Church has been unable to register 
under the same name. (U.S. Department of State (2000) “Estonia”) 
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struggle328, the Orthodox split was not a national-religious conflict, but mainly over 
the property rights329.  
Article 40 of Estonian Constitution says that there is no state church, but the church 
and state are engaged in a constructive dialogue. After Mart Laar became a Prime 
Minister in 1992, the Church wanted to have direct subsidies from the budget and not 
to get state subsidies through the ECC330 as it was done before. From that time on 
started the debate about giving a special status to the biggest churches, namely to 
EELC and EAOC (Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church)331. The joint-commission 
of EELC and government was created in 1995. Although the Fatherland Union had 
lost governmental power by that time, the Minister of the Interior Edgar Savisaar 
stated during the meeting of Church hierarchy and government coalition that EELC 
should not remain a private legal person, but should become a public legal person332. 
The debate become especially intense in 1998, when legal amendments were 
proposed in order to give a status of public-legal person to the largest religious 
groups. 
The joint-commission of EELC and government has working groups in the fields of 
religious education, social work, maintenance of Church buildings, amendments of 
laws regulating the religious market, media and pastoral care in state institutions333. 
From February 1999 the Archbishop of EELC and Minister of the Interior head the 
commission334. 
 
328 For example Arnold Rüütel belongs to Orthodox Church. Rüütel was the Chairman of the Supreme 
Council of Estonia 1990-1992, and from September 21, 2001 was elected the President of the Republic 
of Estonia. 
329 Goeckel 1995:216 
330 “Riigi ja Kiriku koostööst. Peaminister Mart Laar võttis vastu peapiiskopi ja piiskopi”, Eesti Kirik, 
November 19, 1992 
331 Hoppenbrouwers 1999:170; Andres Põder, “Kirik ja riik – partnerid või vaenlased”, Eesti Kirik, 
January 13, 1993 
332 Andres Põder, “Rohkem sotsiaalsust – rohkem demokraatiat!” Eesti Kirik, July 12, 1995 
333 Jaan Kiivit, “Kirik ja riik: vastasseisust koostööni”, Eesti Päevaleht, March 12, 2002 
334 Tiiu Pikkur, “Usundilugu või maailmaõpetus", Eesti Kirik, February  8, 1999 
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State supports financially the registered churches through the Council of Estonian 
Churches335. There has been some discontent among other denominations with the 
fact that majority of the state funds go to the Lutheran Church336 through the joint-
commissions that EELC has with the government.  
Being financially dependent on the state, the Church wants the state to distinguish 
between religious groups337. The Church claims that the Estonian culture is based on 
Lutheranism, so EELC should have different treatment by state338.  
The law for registration of religious communities (1993) is relatively liberal and 
follows pluralist norms339.  
There are laws that guarantee the restitution of the confiscated property by 
Communist regime, but the actual restitution of properties has been delayed in 
several cases340, the whole process is generally considered fair but often slow and 
bureaucratic341. 
The situation with the religious education classes is also a problem, as only few 
children participate342. EELC has little influence over the social norms, partly 
because the Church does not have strong positions and clear proposals in this field. 
 
335 In 1998 the state budget 2 million Estonian crowns was distributed to churches through ECC 
(Kiviorg 1999:10). 
336 Goeckel 1995:215 
337 EELC 1998:13 
338 Ibid. p. 9 
339 It makes no mention of religious instruction in the schools, and guarantees no subsidies for the 
churches. The law proscribes property ownership by churches whose administrative headquarters are 
not in Estonia. (Goeckel 1995:217). 
340 Kadri Ugur, “Kuidas korraldada riigi ja kiriku suhteid?” Eesti Kirik, June 15, 1994; “Peapiiskop 
Jaan Kiiviti mõtteid kiriku päevaprobleemidest”, Eesti Kirik, February 15, 1995 
341 U.S. Department of State (2000) “Estonia” 
342 “Usuõpetusest kultuuri- ja haridusministri Peeter Kreitzbergi pilgu läbi”, Eesti Kirik, June 21, 1995 
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5.2.3. Access of the Church to the government 
The Church has remained neutral regarding the competition of political parties and 
has had access to the government during all three electoral periods. The access was 
strengthened substantially since 1995, when the joint-commissions of the Church and 
government started to work. Weakness of this access lies in the fact that the Church is 
limited in the choice of the radicalism of demands (due to the weakness of 
institutional and symbolical religion, and due to the neutrality of the Church 
regarding political parties), but the strength consists in the fact that this access to 
government is not dependent on the outcome of the elections. The total level of the 
access to the government is counted as middle-weak. 
Table 12. Estonia. Variables and indicators of religion in politics 
Variable Nature and value of the indicators Value of 
the variable
Religion is almost of no importance as an indicator of 
voting preference and party identification (1) 
Religious 
political 
cleavage Religion is not a basis of coalition formation (1) 
Very weak 
(1) 
Process of the restitution of property is fair, but often 
slow (3) 
There are voluntary religious education classes in 
public schools, but in practice few student attend (3) 
Effort of EELC to gain the public-legal status failed (1) 
Goals 
attained by 
the Church 
There is a constructive dialogue between EELC and 
government. EELC receives substantial financial 
assistance from state (4) 
Middle-
weak 
(2.5) 
Access to the 
government 
Access to the government does not depend on the 
political allies, but the radicalism of demands is limited 
by the weakness of institutional and symbolical 
religion, and due to the neutrality of the Church 
regarding political parties 
Middle-
weak 
(2.5) 
Values for the indicators of the goals attained by the Church: 5 points are given if the issue was solved 
favorably for the Church, 4 points are given if the issue was solved basically favorably for the Church 
but with restrictions, 3 points are given for the compromise solution, 2 points are given for the issue 
that was solved unfavorably for the Church, but the Church had some influence over decisions and its 
interests were not ignored totally, 1 point is given for an issue that was solved unfavorably for the 
Church. 
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5.3. Church’s strategies 
There is one Christian Democratic party (FU) and one Christian party (ChPP) in 
Estonia. Since 1992 FU has nearly half of the years been a major governing coalition 
partner, ChPP has not even achieved a seat in Parliament. Besides FU and ChPP 
there were also other parties that expressed their support towards the Church and 
religion in their electoral programs. In 1992 most of the parties remained quite 
indifferent regarding religious matters and were in favor of state and church 
separation, but there were also some parties that saw the role of the Church as an 
ethical integrator of the society, and religion as a source of humanism and 
morality343.  
Table 13. Elections to the Estonian Parliament 1992-1999 
1992 1995  1999 
Votes% Seats Votes% Seats Votes% Seats
Estonian National Independence Party 
(ENIP) 8.8 10 - - - -
Fatherland Union (FU)* 22.0 29 7.9 8 16.1 18
Coalition Party (CP) 13.6 17 32.2 41 7.6 7
Estonian Center Party (CP) 12.2 15 14.2 16 23.4 28
Moderates (MOD) 9.7 12 6.0 6 15.2 17
Independent Royalists (IR) 7.1 8 0.8 0 - -
Better Estonia/Estonian Citizen (BE/EC) 6.9 8 3.6 0 - -
Estonian Reform Party (RP) - - 16.2 19 15.9 18
Estonian United People's Party (UPP) - - 5.9 6 6.1 6
Right Wingers' Party (RWP) - - 5 5 - -
Estonian Country People's Party (CPP) - - - - 7.3 7
Estonian Christian People's Party (ChPP) - - - - 2.4 0
Total 101  101 101
* - FU has been most vocal in professing a pro-Church attitude, but as the actual policy regarding the 
Church has not changed during different governing coalitions, and the Church has not supported any 
party, the list does not identify pro-Church or anti-clerical parties. 
                                                 
343 “Kuidas Eesti erakonnad suhtuvad kristlusesse ja kristlastesse?”, Eesti Kirik, June 11, 1992 
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Fatherland Union is according to its program a Christian Democratic party344, but this 
party has gone through a number of splits and mergers. In 1992 Fatherland was 
formed from five parties, two of them were Estonian Christian Democratic Party 
(ECDP) and Estonian Christian Democratic Union (ECDU). Mart Laar, who was the 
prime minister in 1992-1994 and 1999-2002, was a member of ECDU. In 1994 the 
conservatives and respublicans split from Fatherland, and a year later ENIP and 
Fatherland joined into Fatherland Union.345
Fatherland Union’ main image is related to nationalism and conservatism, and only in 
very broad terms it touches the interests of the Church and religiosity. In this sense 
FU is clearly not a Christian party346. Its ideology is linked up with such Christian 
Democratic ideas like social market economy, social solidarity, co-responsibility, and 
Christian worldview. FU supports the Church and religion in very broad terms and 
does not to identify itself with one Church or even religion347. The image of a 
Christian Democratic party is also pragmatically useful for FU, because the 
international contacts will be important in case of Estonia being accepted to European 
Union348.  
Estonian Christian People’s Party was formed some months before parliamentary 
elections in 1999 and got 2.4% of votes. It appealed more clearly to religious 
electorate and to religious-secular divide in society.  
 
344 The program of Fatherland Union. Homepage of FU, accessed April 4, 2002, 
http://www.isamaaliit.ee/sisu/erakond_programm.php3
345 Toomla 1999:290-291 
346 Goeckel 1995:215 
347 Betlem 1998:5,8 
348 Ibid. p. 7. In 1992 the MP for Fatherland, Andrus Villem said that the reason for establishing 
Christian-democratic parties was to obtain support from abroad more easily (Daatland 1997:61). 
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Mixed strategy with emphasis on neutrality 
If EELC would follow the doctrine of Martin Luther349, it would not interfere into the 
political arena, but there have been several pastors elected to Parliament. Table 14 
shows, that the number of Lutheran pastors elected to Parliament has decreased 
through the years, but the number of Lutheran clergy in the electoral party lists has 
increased. The Church has not identified itself with any political party350, although 
Fatherland Union is perceived to have closer links with EELC than any other 
party351, especially during first two elections.  
Table 14. Lutheran Clergy in the elections to Estonian parliament 
 As candidates in the party lists Elected to Parliament  
1992 8 3 
1995 10 0 
1999 16 1 
Sources for the number of pastors put up as candidates in the party lists: Eesti Kirik, October 10, 1992; 
Eesti Kirik, February 15, 1995; Eesti Kirik, January 27, 1999. 
The EELC has unofficially supported individual candidates who were willing to 
defend the interests of the Church. In 1992 parliamentary election the individual 
Church-loyal candidates of several parties found a coverage in the largest Estonian 
religious publication, weekly paper of the EELC352. Church supported besides its 
pastors also lay-people, who later defended the interests of the Church in the political 
arena. After the formation of a ChPP in December 1998353, Archbishop Jaan Kiivit 
said that EELC did not approve a foundation of a Christian party like ChPP 354. He 
                                                 
349 Martin Luther’s “Zwei-Reiche Lehre” separates spiritual world from earthly one. Both areas are 
according to Luther of divine origin and good by nature, yet separated. Up to nowadays there has 
remained a prevailing tradition that Lutheran clerics do not interfere into political world. 
350 EELC is ready to co-operation with the state and with any political force and interest group (EELC 
1998:3). 
351 In March 1999 EELC hierarchy named Fatherland Union as their most friendly political party 
(Smith-Sivertsen 2000:237).  
352 “Mida ütlevad presidendiks pürgijad usu ja kiriku kohta?”, Eesti Kirik, September 17, 1992. The 
same was done before 1995 and 1999 elections. 
353 “Loodi Kristlik Rahvaerakond”, Eesti Kirik, December 9, 1998 
354 Tiiu Pikkur, “Tallinna sinodil arutati vaimulike osalemist poliitikas”, Eesti Kirik, December 9, 1998 
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stated two weeks before the election in 1999 that “Christians ought to be members of 
the existing parties. It is not dangerous, if Christians belong to opposing parties”355.  
Instead of finding a party whom to give its support, the EELC issued a document 
about the role of the Church in society (1998), which was meant as a guiding 
document for all church members who participate in politics, also for the parties that 
are willing to accept Christian principles356.  
Until that document was published, the positions of the EELC on several religious-
social issues were quite unclear. In 1995 the Lutheran pastors were against abortion, 
but the positions of the EELC clergy regarding the capital punishment differed, with 
a bias to be in opposition to the death penalty357. EELC does not make radical 
statements on issues linked to moral values. While the positions and proposals for the 
government remain quite vague in this field, there is not much doubt about the 
institutional goals of the EELC.  
EELC has preferred to have joint commissions with the government and remain 
neutral regarding the political parties. Nearly all of the governments have been 
interested in co-operation with the EELC as long as it would not participate in any 
political competition and would not be in favor of any party358. There are no anti-
clerical parties in Estonia. 
The strategy of the EELC was nevertheless never total neutrality regarding political 
competition. Before 1992, ECDU and later FU have had close contacts with the 
Church, and the number of clergy participating in electoral contest has increased. Yet 
 
355 Tiiu Pikkur, “Kristlane Erakonnapoliitikas”, Eesti Kirik, February 24, 1999 
356 Urmas Petti, “Kirik teadvustab oma missiooni ühiskonnas”, Eesti Kirik, March 17, 1999 
357 “Peapiiskop Jaan Kiiviti mõtteid kiriku päevaprobleemidest”, Eesti Kirik, February 15, 1995 
358 Such statement was made by Prime Minister Mart Siimann in 1998 (“Riik on alati valmis 
konstruktiivseks koostööks kirikuga”, Eesti Kirik, July 1, 1998). Also next Prime Minister Mart Laar 
made a similar statement (Tiiu Pikkur, “Kirik on kutsutud teenima inimest nii igaveses kui ajalikus 
elus”, Eesti Kirik, July 15, 1998). 
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the tendency of the Church is to stress more its neutrality and the main way to defend 
its interests is through direct commissions with the government. During 1990s the 
Church has become more moderate in its demands and more neutral regarding party 
competition. 
5.4. Discussion 
The strategic choice of the Church to remain outside the competition of political 
parties has given it a relatively good relationship with all political parties. The 
Church has not been able to raise radical demands and its goals are attained only on a 
moderate level, but in comparison with the weakness of religion in Estonian society, 
the Church has been surprisingly successful in defending its institutional interests. 
Official neutrality in combination with the individual clergy participating in electoral 
contest between the party lists, unofficial support to individual candidates who were 
willing to defend the interests of the Church, close links to Fatherland Union, and 
active lobby-work on the government level have worked well for the EELC. 
Both alternative choices – more radical demands and lending support to political 
parties – would have forced the Church into isolation due to its institutional 
weakness. 
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Chapter 6. Comparison of cases 
6.1. Religion in society 
The comparison of structural variables in case studies shows that the Polish Catholic 
Church has the strongest resources (institutional and symbolical religion) and Poland 
has also the strongest religious social conflict. There is a co-relation between the 
strength of symbolical religion, the strength of institutional religion and the strength 
of the religious social cleavage of the cases. Table 15 presents the values that the 
variables for religion in society have obtained in the case studies.  
Table 15. Comparison. The strength of institutional and symbolical religion, and 
religious social cleavage 
 POL HUN CZH EST 
Strength of 
symbolical religion 
Very strong (5) Strong (4) Middle (3) Weak (2) 
Strength of 
institutional religion 
Very strong (5) Strong (4) Weak (2) Very weak (1)
Religious-secular 
cleavage 
Very strong (5) Middle (3) Weak (2) Very weak (1)
Clerical/anti-clerical 
cleavage 
Very strong (5) Strong (4) Middle (3) Very weak (1)
 
According to every indicator (religious social cleavage, institutional religion and 
symbolical religion), religion is the strongest in the society of Poland and the weakest 
in the society of Estonia, Hungary has the second place and the Czech Republic 
comes third. The co-relation between the strength-values of the cases is shown also 
on the Figure 4. There is no deviation from co-relations as far as the independent 
variables are concerned.  
Figure 4. Comparison of the indicators of the independent variables  
 
 religious social  institutional symbolical  
strong cleavage religion religion 
               Poland Poland Poland 
               Hungary Hungary Hungary 
               The Czech Republic The Czech Republic The Czech Republic 
               Estonia Estonia Estonia 
weak 
In order to test the values that the independent variables obtained in case studies, 
additional data is presented in Table 16 for the comparison of strength-values of 
independent variables of the cases. This data tests the strength-value relationship of 
institutional religion between the cases, but cannot test the strength-value relationship 
of symbolical religion or religious social cleavage. 
Table 16. Comparison. Indicators of institutional religion 
 POL HUN CZH EST 
Religious 
affiliation 
99.2% 74.4% 40.3% 17% 
Attends Church at 
least once a week 
55% 22% 14% 4% 
Confessional map 96% 56.4% Catholic 
16.8% Protestant
34.9% Catholic 
3.6% Protestant 
11% Lutheran 
Source: religious affiliation and confessional map: religious affiliation of Poland, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic in 1993-4 (Need et al 2001:236), for Estonia Ringvee 2001; religious attendance 
(World Value surveys 1990-1991, 1995-1997) 
It is evident that the strength-value relationship of institutional religion is from 
strongest to weakest: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Estonia. Both the 
levels of religious affiliation and religious attendance testify to the fact that these 
cases have different strength-values of institutional religion and that the relationship 
of the strength-values of institutional religion obtained in the case studies is correct. 
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According to European Values Study Surveys the levels of the sentiment of anti-
clericalism deviate from the strength-values of religious social cleavage that the cases 
obtained in case studies. As seen from Table 17, the sentiment of anti-clericalism in 
society (calculated as an average from 6 indicators of the anti-clericalism) is even 
more spread in Estonia than in Poland. Yet the higher level of anti-clericalism 
sentiment in Estonia does not prove that there is also a stronger religious social 
cleavage. In Estonia there is no religious social cleavage, but in Poland, there exists a 
strong religious social cleavage. The reason for the absence of the religious social 
cleavage in Estonia lies in the fact that the population in Estonia has overwhelmingly 
anti-clerical attitudes or is indifferent regarding this issue. Without meaningful 
opposition, there is no conflict.  
Table 17. Comparison. Anti-clericalism among population in 1999 (percentage 
of positive answers to the raised questions) 
 POL HUN CZH EST 
Strongly disagree and disagree with the following: 
Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for 
public office  
64.3 65.7 80.2 59.1 
Strongly disagree or disagree with the following: 
it would be better for your country if more people 
with strong religious beliefs held public office  
42.7 50.1 71.6 42.2 
Religious leaders should not influence 
government decisions  
80.9 69.6 74 74.7 
Religious leaders should not influence how people 
vote in elections 
85.7 76.5 80.5 84.3 
Churches are not giving adequate answers to 
social problems facing my country today  
60.8 75.0 84.5 85.9 
No Confidence in Church at all  7.4 24.6 39 17.3 
Average anticlericalism 57 60.25 71.63 60.58 
Source: European Values Study Surveys of 1999 in Halman 2001:85,104-107,185 
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6.2. Religion in politics 
All the cases, except the Estonian case, did fulfill the pre-conditions of the formation 
of the religious political divide, as there existed both institutional and symbolical 
strength of religion and also a religious social cleavage. Although the Estonian 
Church had weak measure of symbolical strength of religion, it was institutionally 
very weak, and in accordance with the stated hypothesis, Estonian party politics does 
not have a religious political divide. As seen from Table 18, all other cases had by the 
third parliamentary election the religious political cleavage.  
Table 18. Comparison. Religious political cleavage 
 POL HUN CZH EST 
Religious political 
cleavage 
Strong  
(4) 
Very strong 
(5) 
Middle  
(3) 
Very weak 
(1) 
Politicized religious 
issues that remained 
divisive 
Abortion, 
public role 
of the 
Church 
Church-state 
relationship 
Restitution 
of properties, 
Church-state 
relationship 
– 
 
The Estonian case did not fulfill the condition of the hypothesis, which holds the 
religious social cleavage and the strength of religion in society as necessary variables 
for the strength of religion in politics. In Estonian case there is no big religious 
conflict neither in society nor in politics. In Czech case, the clericalism conflict has 
entered political arena and also in the cases of Hungary and Poland the social 
cleavages have been translated into political competition. But there is a deviation in 
the order of the strength-values of the cases (see Figure 5): the religious political 
cleavage is the strongest in Hungary and not in Poland, because in Hungary it has 
produced a stronger polarization, it is a stronger indicator of voting preference, a 
clearer basis of coalition formation and also more clearly overlaps with other 
cleavages.  
Only in the case of Poland have the moral issues (like abortion) become really 
divisive in political arena. The divisive politicized issues, even in the case of Estonia, 
had mainly to do with the financial subsidies to the Church and Church-state 
relationship.  
 
Figure 5. Comparison of indicators of religious social cleavage and religious 
political cleavage 
 
 religious social  religious political 
strong cleavage cleavage 
               Poland Hungary 
               Hungary Poland  
               The Czech Republic The Czech Republic 
               Estonia Estonia 
weak 
Deviation 1. The religious political cleavage is stronger in Hungary than in Poland, 
although the religious social cleavage, and also institutional and symbolical religion, 
is stronger in Poland than in Hungary.  
The second variable of the religion in politics is the goals attained by the Church. The 
Catholic Church in Poland has gained widest influence upon the legislation dealing 
with the social norms (abortion, religious censorship of media, divorce laws), and 
religious education. By and large the Polish Church has also achieved its institutional 
goals: all of the Churches pushed for more restrictive laws for registration of 
religious groups, but only Polish Church succeeded. The issues like restitution of 
property and financial assistance were solved already in the beginning of transition, 
and while not all wishes of the Church became manifested in the Constitution and 
Concordat, the Polish Church has clearly achieved most.  
The values obtained in case studies for the goals attained by the Church and the 
access of the Church to the government are presented in the Table 19. 
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Table 19. Comparison. Goals attained by the Church and Church’s access to the 
government 
 POL HUN CZH EST 
Goals attained by the Church 5 3.5 1.5 2.5 
Access to the government 4 3 1 2.5 
Source: values obtained in case studies 
The Church in Hungarian case has managed to defend its traditional privileges and 
enjoys the high levels of state financial assistance. The Estonian Evangelical 
Lutheran Church has definitely achieved more as an institution than Czech Catholic 
Church (see Figure 6). Their social influence has been materialized in a very low 
level, in Estonian case the religious education is taken as the modest achievement of 
the Church in this field, in Czech case the fact that the Church at least indirectly 
influenced the final solution of abortion law (that it did not become liberal). But in 
issues linked to institutional influence, the Estonian Church has better results on 
every level – restitution of property, financial subsidies, and Church’s autonomy 
from state. Only the registration of religious groups is stricter in the Czech Republic, 
but as there are 21 religions receiving state financial assistance in the Czech 
Republic, the actual situation (of state financing the dominant Church) is better in 
Estonia.  
Figure 6. Comparison of the strength-values of religion in society and goals 
attained by the Church 
 
 Religion in  Goals attained  
strong society by the Church 
               Poland Poland 
               Hungary Hungary  
               The Czech Republic Estonia 
               Estonia The Czech Republic  
weak 
 99
Deviation 2. The religion is stronger in the society of the Czech Republic than in 
Estonian society according to every indicator, but the Church in Estonia has gained 
more of its goals than the Church in the Czech Republic. 
Third variable of the strength of religion in society is the access of the Church to the 
Government. Figure 7 shows the deviation from the co-relations between the 
strength-values of religion in society and access of the Church to the government 
(shown in Table 19). 
Figure 7. Comparison of the strength-values of religion in society and goals 
attained by the Church 
 
 Religion in  Access of the Church 
strong society to the government 
               Poland Poland 
               Hungary Hungary  
               The Czech Republic Estonia 
               Estonia The Czech Republic  
weak 
Deviation 3. The religion is stronger in the society of the Czech Republic than in the 
Estonian society according to every indicator, but the Church in Estonia has gained a 
better level of access to the government than the Church in the Czech Republic. 
Can these three deviations be explained by the causal effect of denominational 
differences? The Church doctrine itself did not pre-determine the strategic choices, 
intensity of demands (exactly which solution on abortion should still be fought 
against or not) and even the content of the demands that the Church chose. The 
Churches of the same denomination used different strategies and radicalism of 
demands. They were ultimately constrained not by their theological doctrine, but the 
structural resources available.  
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The strategy of the Czech Catholic Church to support one party only was not shared 
by the Polish Catholic Church, which did not identify itself with any particular party. 
The Lutheran Church in Hungary did not share the position of neutrality regarding 
the political competition of parties that the Estonian Lutheran Church had.  
Can these deviations be explained simply by the institutional strength of the Church? 
The institutional strength of the Church does not co-relate with the found deviations. 
The Church in Poland was institutionally stronger than Hungarian Church. The 
strategic choices of the Church that was institutionally weaker caused a stronger 
outcome. Also the Czech Church was institutionally stronger than the Estonian 
Church, but according to two indicators, the coming of religion to politics was 
stronger in Estonian case.  
Three stated deviations from the co-relations testify to the fact that the strategic 
choices of the Church have influenced the outcome – the strength of religion in 
politics. The comparison of the strategies used by the Church in the cases explains 
the causal mechanism of Church’ choices. 
6.3. Church’ strategies 
The Churches usually started with more radical demands and with more extreme 
strategy. In all countries, except Poland, the Church had distanced itself from 
Christian parties by the third elections. Also in Poland the formation of grand 
coalition of parties testifies to the fact that the Church became inclined towards more 
moderate demands and the Christian Democratic strategy. The only Church that 
chose to identify with one party, was the Catholic Church in the Czech Republic. The 
change of the strategy used by the Church is presented in Table 20 and Figure 8. 
 
Table 20. Comparison. Church’s strategies and radicalism of demands 
 POL HUN CZH EST 
 Strat. Dem. Strat. Dem. Strat. Dem. Strat. Dem. 
1st 
election 
C R CD-C M C,  
1 party
R N 
(CD) 
M-R 
3rd 
election 
C-CD R-M CD M CD-N M N M 
Strategies: C – Christian strategy; CD – Christian Democratic strategy; Neutral strategy; 1 party – 
choice to support only one party. 
Demands: R – radical demands, M – moderate demands 
 
Figure 8. Comparison of preferences and strategies of the Churches in the 
parliamentary elections 
 
Neutrality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Christian  
Democratic 
 
 
 
 
                  
Christian 
 
 
 
 
POL1 
POL3 
CZH1 
CZH3 
HUN1 
HUN3 
EST1 
EST3 
                       Radical demands         (R-M)              (M-R) Moderate demands 
 
 
There has been a change in strategies used by the church. The Churches of all the 
cases have changed the radicalism of their demands or strategy used in attaining their 
goals. The formation of religious political cleavage was not in the interests of the 
Church. The aim of the Church has been to attain its goals, and if the goals have not 
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been met using one strategy, the Church tried another; if too radical demands have 
proved to be counter-productive, the Church has taken more moderate positions.  
6.4. Discussion 
There arose three deviations from the co-relations between the strength-values of the 
independent and dependent variables. Three questions need to be answered: (1) Why 
is the religious political cleavage stronger in Hungary than in Poland, while the 
religious social cleavage, institutional and symbolical religion, is stronger in Poland? 
(2) Why the Czech Church, that is obviously stronger institutionally than Estonian 
Church, has been less able to attain its goals? (3) Why the Czech Church has not 
gained access to government, but Estonian Church, which had much weaker starting 
point, has managed with it? 
Strategic choices of the Church that led to deviation 1  
In Hungarian case the strength of symbolical religion in combination with moderate 
demands from the traditional churches did provide symbols for parties to identify for 
and against, and to organize political confrontation. Important here is the fact that the 
traditional churches retained their position of moderate claims during elections and 
eventually concentrated more on a Christian Democratic strategy (the more radical 
stands of the first two elections were eliminated by the third), and as a result the 
religious polarization of parties endured!  
The radical demands of the Polish and Czech Churches caused an increase of anti-
clericalism, and the political opposition became biased, becoming unfavorable for the 
Church, especially in the Czech case. The Catholic Church in Poland came out of 
crises taking more moderate positions and moderate strategy. The polarization of 
political parties was again effective in 1997 Sejm elections, but as the coalition of 
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right-wing parties was not able to hold on to relatively moderate program, the 
polarization became later again biased towards anti-clericalism.  
The Czech Catholic Church saw a way out of crises by reducing the radicalism of 
demands and by a shift towards neutrality regarding the political competition of 
parties, but the Church was constrained by the choices earlier made. 
Strategic choices of the Churches that led to deviations 2 and 3 
The choice of the strategy was important for both Estonian and Czech Church, as 
both saw a need to change their strategy. Estonian Church saw a need to distance 
itself more clearly from the competition of political parties and to suffuse all this 
competition with broad Christian values. In Czech case the symbolical religion was 
essentially against the Czech Catholic Church. The Church anyway decided to take 
part in the political competition of parties and did it with radical demands. The 
parties reacted and used the symbolical religion. The eventual outcome, the formation 
of religious political cleavage, was unfavorable for the Church, as it was strongly 
biased towards anti-clericalism. Yet it was not the strength or content of the 
symbolical religion that determined all in the longer perspective. If the Catholic 
Church of the Czech Republic had chosen more moderate demands, and/or neutrality 
regarding political competition of parties, the results could have been different. The 
chances of the parties to use the symbolical religion against the Church would have 
decreased. The actual choice of the strategy led to the situation that the Church’s 
interests were represented at the level of one party, but not more. The Church did not 
get access to the government and so most of its goals remained unfulfilled.  
The Estonian Church lacked institutional strength that the Czech Church had. The 
Church chose moderate demands and neutrality regarding the political competition of 
parties. The choice of the Church to remain outside the political competition of 
parties has provided the Church with access to government and also a better level of 
the goals attained.  
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Estonia is the only case, where the Church did not enter into the political 
competition, or entered only marginally (and by third election it became more 
carefully neutral). The Estonian church could have chosen not to stay out of the 
political competition. If the church had acted like the Church in Poland or in the 
Czech Republic (used radical demands) or the Church would have chosen moderate 
demands, but still would have taken part in the competition of political parties, the 
very low institutional strength (that is the necessary variable according to 
hypothesis!) would have caused very low importance of religious politicized issues, 
and the Church would have ended in isolation, with no access to the government and 
with goals unfulfilled like in the case of the Czech Church. The Czech Church chose 
a wrong strategy in pursuing its interests.  
The neutrality regarding the political competition of parties would be better for both 
cases, because the Czech Church lacks positive symbolical religion, and the Estonian 
Church lacks institutional strength. After three electoral periods both Churches 
recognized that.  
The small potential of the symbolical religion in the case of Estonia is used to 
legitimize the neutrality of the Church in relations with the political parties and 
benevolent co-operation between Church and state.  
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Conclusion 
This thesis analyses the process of politicization of religious issues in four post-
communist countries – Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Estonia. The main 
question of the study is, whether the religion that exists in society will eventually 
come to politics anyway or is this coming (or not coming) of the religion influenced 
also by the strategic choices of the Church. The hypothesis of the study stated: The 
religious social cleavage and the strength of religion in society are necessary but not 
sufficient variables for the strength of religion in politics. The actual outcome is 
largely influenced by the strategic choices of the Church.  
The thesis has been faced with several tasks. First task was to identify the situation 
and the values of the variables in four countries of this study. In each case study the 
values of the religion in society (institutional religion, symbolical religion and 
religious social cleavage), of the religion in politics (political cleavage, goals attained 
by the Church and access of the Church to the government) and of the condition 
variable (the strategic choices made by the Church) were analysed.  
Second task was to compare the cases by using the values that the variables of the 
cases obtained in the case studies and to find out deviations from co-relations 
between the strength of religion in society and religion in politics. The raised 
hypothesis would not have passed the test, if there were found no deviations between 
the strength of religion in society and the strength of religion in politics. But the 
comparative analysis of the cases showed that there were three strong deviations.  
Third task was to analyse whether these deviations were caused by the strategic 
choices made by the Church. The comparison of cases showed that the causal 
mechanism that led to these deviations was not the outcome of denominational 
differences, or institutional strength of the Church.  
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The church had to find an optimal solution in the choice of radicalism of its demands 
and in choosing a political way for attaining its goals. As a pre-condition, the 
Churches had to consider the institutional and symbolical strength of religion 
available. The outcomes (the strength of religion in politics) depended on two 
conditions: the strength of social religious conflict and strength of religion in society 
(a necessary condition) and the choices made by the Church (a sufficient condition). 
The comparison of the four case studies shows that the strategies used by the Church 
and the choice of radicalism of its demands have influenced also the strength of 
religion in politics. In all of the cases, Church changed the strategy during three 
parliamentary elections.  
The comparison of cases gave three deviations. Deviation 1 showed that the religious 
political cleavage was stronger in Hungary than in Poland, although the religious 
social cleavage, and also institutional and symbolical religion was stronger in Poland 
than in Hungary. Deviations 2 and 3 stated that although religion was stronger in the 
society of the Czech Republic than in Estonian society according to every indicator, 
the Church in Estonia gained still more of its goals and had better access to 
government than the Czech Church.  
The strategic choice of the Hungarian Church to have moderate demands and to 
concentrate on Christian Democratic strategy caused a higher level of religious 
political cleavage than in Poland, where the Church used radical demands and a 
Christian strategy, which eventually caused the bias of the religious political cleavage 
towards anticlericalism (i.e. the political cleavage became weaker).  
The Estonian Church chose to remain neutral regarding the political competition of 
parties and made moderate demands, but the Czech Church used radical demands and 
a radical strategy, which caused the religious political cleavage to be strongly biased 
towards anti-clericalism, and put the Czech Church into worse situation regarding the 
access of the Church to the government. The radical demands of the Church caused 
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the rise of anti-clericalism and the Church could present its interests only on the level 
of one party, their political ally KDU-CSL, but not on the level of government.  
These deviations from co-relations were unintended outcomes of the strategic choices 
made by the Church. The Church was willing to defend its interests, but had to 
balance the choice of the strategy and radicalism of its demands with the uncertainty 
of access to government that this choice involves. The Church was interested to see 
its goals fulfilled and needed an access to government for that. The emergence of 
religious political cleavage was not in the interests of the Church. It was an 
unintended outcome or by-product of the activity of the Church.  
All cases of this study proved that the transformation of religion into politics did not 
happen automatically nor was it derived from the religious creed. The results of this 
thesis show that the religious market theory can be used in the analysis of the 
political and social activity of the Church. The same theory can be efficiently used 
for comparison of the activity of the Church in different countries without 
concentrating on the denominational differences. The choices of the Church are not 
pre-determined by its doctrine, and the public activities of different denominations 
can effectively be analysed by using comparative method.  
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Appendix: Abbreviations used in the text and the 
tables 
EAOC: Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church 
ECC: Estonian Council of Churches 
ECC-EBS-EEA: Estonian Council of Churches, Estonian Bible Society and Estonian 
Evangelical Alliance  
EELC: Estonian Evangelical Lutheran Church 
PGSS: Polish General Social Surveys 
ISSP: International Social Survey Programme 
 
Political parties 
Poland 
AWS: Solidarity Electoral Action 
BBWR: Nonpartisan Block for Reforms 
ChD: Christian Democracy 
KdR: Coalition for Republic 
KLD: Liberal Democratic Congress  
KPN: Confederation for Independent Poland 
NSZZ: NSZZ Solidarity  
PL: Peasant Alliance 
POC: Central Democratic Alliance 
PSL: Polish Peasant Party  
RDS: Democratic-Social Movement 
ROP: Movement for Reconstruction of Poland 
SLD: Democratic Left Alliance 
SP: Labour Solidarity 
UD: Democratic Union 
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UP: Labour Union  
UW: Freedom Union 
WAK: Catholic Electoral Action 
ZP-PC: Union of Poland-Central Alliance 
 
Hungary 
FIDESZ: Federation of Young Democrats  
FKGP: Independent Small Holders Party  
KDNP: Christian Democratic People's Party  
MDF: Hungarian Democratic Forum  
MIEP: Party of Hungarian Justice and Life  
MSZDP: Social Democratic Party of Hungary  
MSZMP: Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party  
MNP: Hungarian People's Party  
MSZP: Hungarian Socialist Party  
SZDSZ: Alliance of Free Democrats 
 
The Czech Republic 
CSSD: Czech Social Democratic Party 
ODS: Civic Democratic Party 
KSCM: Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia 
KDU-CSL: Christian Democratic Union-Czech People's Party 
US: Freedom Union 
RSC-SPR: Republican Party of Czechoslovakia 
ODA: Civic Democratic Alliance 
LSU: Liberal Social Union 
HSD-SMS: Society for Moravia and Silesia 
 
Estonia 
BE/EC: Better Estonia/Estonian Citizen 
ChPP: Estonian Christian People's Party  
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CP: Coalition Party  
CPP: Estonian Country People's Party  
ECDP: Estonian Christian Democratic Party  
ECDU: Estonian Christian Democratic Union 
ECP: Estonian Center Party 
ENIP:  Estonian National Independence Party 
FU: Fatherland Union  
IR: Independent Royalists 
MOD: Moderates 
RP: Estonian Reform Party  
RWP: Right Wingers' Party  
UPP: Estonian United People's Party  
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Magistritöö lühikokkuvõte 
Käesolev magistritöö “Religioon ja poliitika: usuküsimuste politiseerimise 
dünaamika neljas post-kommunistlikus riigis” uurib, kuidas usuküsimused on 
jõudnud poliitikasse Poolas, Ungaris, Tšehhi Vabariigis ja Eestis. Maade valikul oli 
määravaks asjaolu, et need riigid olid olnud sama kaua kommunistliku võimu all, 
neis on toimunud edukas demokratiseerumine ning nad pakuvad erinevaid väärtuste 
kombinatsioone nii sõltuvale kui sõltumatule muutujale. Uurimuse põhiküsimuseks 
on, kas ühiskonnas esinev religioon ja usuline lõhe jõuavad aja möödudes nii või 
teisiti poliitikasse või sõltub usuküsimuste poliitikasse jõudmine (ja mitte jõudmine) 
ka kiriku strateegilistest otsustest. Uurimuse teoreetiliseks aluseks on religioonituru 
teooria ja ühiskondliku lõhe mudel. 
Töö hüpotees kõlab järgmiselt: Usulis-ühiskondlik lõhe ja religiooni tugevus 
ühiskonnas on tarvilikud, kuid mitte piisavad tingimused usu tugevuseks poliitikas. 
Usu jõudmine poliitikasse on mõjutatud ka kiriku strateegilistest otsustest. 
Käesolevas magistritöös tuli lahendada mitu ülesannet. Esiteks tuli kindlaks määrata 
olukord uurimuse all olevates maades (ehk üksikjuhtumites) ning teha kindlaks 
uuritavate sõltuvate ja sõltumatute muutujate väärtused üksikjuhtumite analüüsis. Iga 
üksikjuhtumi analüüsis omistati väärtused religiooni tugevusele ühiskonnas (mille 
indikaatoriteks on institutsionaalse religiooni, sümboolse religiooni ja usulis-
ühiskondliku lõhe tugevus), religiooni tugevusele poliitikas (mille indikaatoriteks on 
usulis-poliitiline lõhe, kiriku saavutatud eesmärgid ja kiriku juurdepääs 
valitsusvõimule) ja teha kindlaks ka tingimusliku muutuja väärtused (kiriku 
strateegilised valikud).  
Teiseks ülesandeks oli võrrelda üksikjuhtumeid kasutades eelnevas analüüsis 
üksikjuhtumite muutujatele omistatud väärtusi. Võrdluse eesmärgiks oli leida 
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kõrvalekaldeid üksikjuhtumite tugevusjärjestuses religiooni ühiskondliku tugevuse ja 
poliitilise tugevuse võrdlemisel. Kui sõltumatute ja sõltuvate muutujate väärtuste 
võrdlemisel ei oleks leidunud ühtegi kõrvalekallet üksikjuhtumite tugevusjärjestuses, 
siis osutunuks püstitatud hüpotees valeks. Kuid juhtumite võrdlev analüüs tõi esile 
mitu kõrvalekallet.  
Kolmandaks ülesandeks oli analüüsida, kas nende kõrvalekallete põhjuseks oli kiriku 
poolt tehtud strateegilised otsused. Juhtumite võrdlus näitas, et põhjuslikku seost 
nende kõrvalekallete ja strukturaalsete tegurite (denominatsiooniliste erinevuste ja 
kiriku institutsionaalse tugevuse) vahel ei ole.  
Kirik otsis parimat lahendust, kuidas kaitsta oma huvisid. Oma seisukohtade 
radikaalsuse ja poliitiliste liitlaste valiku üle otsustamisel pidi kirik arvestama ka, et 
radikaalsed seisukohad ja radikaalsed poliitilised liitlased esindavad küll paremini 
kiriku huve, kuid vähendavad tõenäosust, et kiriku huvid saavad esindatud 
valitsusvõimu tasemel. Eeltingimusena pidi kirik ka arvestama tema käsutuses oleva 
institutsionaalse ja sümboolse religiooni ressursi suurusega. Religiooni jõudmine 
poliitikasse sõltus kahest tingimusest: ühiskondlik-usulise lõhe tugevusest ja 
religiooni tugevusest ühiskonnas (tarvilik tingimus) ja ka kiriku strateegilistest 
otsustest (piisav tingimus). 
Nelja üksikjuhtumi võrdlus näitab, et see, kui radikaalsed või mõõdukad positsioonid 
ja liitlased kirik valis, mõjutas religiooni tugevust poliitikas. Kõigis juhtumites kirik 
pidas vajalikuks muuta oma strateegiat kolmedel esimestel parlamendi valimistel.  
Üksikjuhtumite sõltumatute ja sõltuvate muutujate väärtuste võrdlemisel tuli esile 
kolm kõrvalekallet: (1) usulis-poliitiline lõhe oli Ungaris tugevam kui Poolas, kuigi 
usulis-ühiskondlik lõhe ning ka institutsionaalne ja sümboolne usk olid Poolas 
tugevamad kui Ungaris; (2) kuigi religioon ühiskonnas oli iga indikaatori põhjal 
Tšehhi Vabariigis tugevam kui Eestis, siiski saavutas kirik Eestis rohkem oma 
institutsionaalseid eesmärke kui kirik Tšehhis; (3) kuigi religioon ühiskonnas oli iga 
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indikaatori põhjal Tšehhi Vabariigis tugevam kui Eestis, omas Eesti kirik oluliselt 
paremat juurdepääsu valitsusvõimule kui Tšehhi kirik. 
Ungari kiriku strateegiline valik jääda mõõdukate nõudmiste ja kristlik-
demokraatliku strateegia juurde tõi kaasa suurema usulis-poliitilise lõhe kui Poolas, 
kus kiriku radikaalsed nõudmised ja ka otsus toetada parteisid, kes esindasid 
radikaalseid seisukohti, tõi kaasa usulis-poliitilise lõhe kaldumise antiklerikalismi 
suunas (ehk usulis-poliitilise lõhe vähenemise). 
Eesti luterlik kirik otsustas jääda parteipoliitika suhtes neutraalseks ning ei esitanud 
riigile ka radikaalseid nõudmisi. Tšehhi kirik seevastu kasutas radikaalseid nõudmisi 
ja ka sekkus parteipoliitikasse radikaalselt, toetades selgelt vaid ühte parteid. 
Tagajärjeks oli usulis-poliitilise lõhe kaldumine antiklerikalismi suunas ning Tšehhi 
katoliku kirik leidis end lõpptulemusena halvemast olukorrast kui Eesti luterlik kirik 
nii juurdepääsu osas valitsusvõimule kui ka oma institutsionaalsete huvide täitmise 
osas. Tšehhi kiriku radikaalsed nõudmised tõid kaasa antiklerikalismi tõusu ning 
kiriku huvid olid esindatud ühe partei tasemel, kuid mitte valitsusvõimu tasemel. 
Mainitud kõrvalekalded olid kiriku strateegiliste valikute soovimatud tagajärjed. 
Kirik soovis kaitsta oma huve, kuid ühelt poolt tuli tal valida oma seisukohtade 
radikaalsus ja strateegia, teiselt poolt aga tuli tal arvestada ka sellega, et mida 
suuremad ja radikaalsemad on nõudmised, seda vähemaks jääb tõenäosus, et need 
huvid saavad esindatud valitsusvõimu tasemel.  
Kirik oli huvitatud oma eesmärkide täitmisest ja vajas selleks juurdepääsu 
valitsusvõimule. Usulis-poliitilise lõhe teke ei olnud kiriku huvides. See oli kiriku 
tegevuse soovimatu tagajärg. 
Kõik üksikjuhtumi analüüsid näitasid, et usu ülekandmine poliitikasse ei toimunud 
automaatselt ega tulenenud ka denominatsioonilistest erinevustest.  
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Antud magistritöö tulemused annavad tunnistuse sellest, et ratsionaalse valiku 
teooriast alguse saanud religioonituru teooriat (religious market theory) saab 
kasutada kiriku poliitilise tegevuse analüüsimisel. 
See teooria võimaldab ka edukalt võrrelda eri denominatsioonidesse kuuluvate 
suurkirikute tegevust erinevates maades, sest usuliste institutsioonidena omavad need 
kirikud sarnaseid huve ja väljakutseid ning nende valikud ei ole ette määratud kiriku 
teoloogilise õpetuse poolt.  
Võrdlevat meetodit ja religioonituru teooriat kasutades saab edukalt analüüsida 
erinevate denominatsioonide poliitilist tegevust. 
